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Abstract
Quantifying flow of information in a program involves calculating how
much information (e.g. about secret inputs) can be leaked by observing the
program’s public outputs. Recently this field has attracted a lot of research
interest, most of which makes use of Shannon’s information theory, e.g. mu-
tual information, conditional entropy, etc.
Computability entails that any automated analysis of information is nec-
essarily incomplete. Thus quantitative flow of analyses aim to compute upper
bounds on the sizes of the flows in a program. Virtually all the current quan-
titative analyses treat program variables independently, which significantly
limits the potential for deriving tight upper bounds.
Our work is motivated by the intuition that knowledge of the dependen-
cies between program variables should allow the derivation of more precise
upper bounds on the size of flows, and that classical abstract interpretation
provides an effective mechanism for determining such dependencies in the
form of linear constraints. Our approach is then to view the problem as
one of constrained optimization (maximum entropy), allowing us to apply
the standard technique of Lagrange multiplier method. Application of this
technique turns out to require development of some novel methods due to
the essential use of non-linear (entropy) constraints, in conjunction with the
linear dependency constraints.
Using these methods we obtain more precise upper bounds on the size of
information flows than is possible with existing analysis techniques.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With the ever faster development of computer systems and internet (both in
size and complexity) and society’s increasing dependence on them, the ques-
tion of how to protect information from being improperly leaked is of greater
and greater importance. This is because governments, military, corpora-
tions, financial institutions, hospitals and private businesses amass a great
deal of confidential, sensitive and private information about their employees,
customers, products, research, financial status etc. Besides these large orga-
nizations, for individuals, how to protect privacy is also of vital importance.
This is the topic of information security which is the broader area our work
belongs to.
There are three core principles to information security: confidentiality,
integrity and availability (known as the CIA triad). Basically speaking, con-
fidentiality prevents information flowing to inappropriate destinations, while
integrity requires that information is prevented from inappropriate sources
such as a person sneakily changing their own salary in the payroll database.
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Integrity can be breached without any violation of confidentiality and also
strong enforcement of integrity usually requires proving program correct-
ness. Finally availability means that information must be available when it
is needed. We are mainly concerned with confidentiality here (in the follow-
ing, the uses of information flow policy, if without any special denotation,
mean confidentiality policy). Neither access control nor encryption provide
complete solutions for protecting confidentiality as they cannot control the
propagation once the secret information is released.
A complementary approach is to track and regulate the information flow
of the system to prevent confidential data from leaking to unauthorized par-
ties. This can be implemented statically by establishing some predefined
policy with respect to the data. Information flow policy is an example of
such a policy which enforces limits on how the information contained in the
confidential data might be revealed in subsequent computations.
The most well known policy is the non-interference [30], which requires
that any variation of the secret high input(s) to the system cannot result
in any variation of the observable low output(s). Non-interference is widely
pointed out to be overly strict as it requires an absolute independence of low
variable(s) on high variable(s) (if this holds, then the high variables may as
well be removed completely from the system) which is impossible in practical
systems. Thus far too many programs would be rejected as insecure by this
policy, such as the password checking program which is widely used in our
daily life for example an ATM machine, with high (secure) input password
10
and low (public) output output:
if guess==password
output:=pass;
else
output:=deny
fi
The value of output will vary according to the value of password therefore it
violates non-interference yet it is commonly assumed to be secure; moreover,
with the increasingly complexity of modern computer systems, not only do
high variables interfere with low variables all the time but high inputs are
interacting with each other among themselves, and the ways these variables
interact are becoming increasingly complicated. Therefore, non-interference,
although fairly rigorous and ideal, has a big gap in terms of feasible applica-
tion.
Over the years, there has been a lot of effort put into relaxing non-
interference, such as robust declassification [59, 58, 71, 42], delimited in-
formation release [65], flow-sensitive type systems [37] and abstract non-
interference [29].
Our work is to try to bridge this gap as well, however, through a different
way—via quantitative information flow analysis.
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1.1 Quantitative Information Flow Analysis
Non-interference and the later work mentioned above that aims to make
it more practical are all qualitative, which means that it can only judge a
system as secure or insecure according to their own specifications. However,
sometimes only knowing this fact is not as informative as to what extent
the system is not secure. If the extent to which the system is considered
to be insecure is very low, then the system should still be considered safe
to use. As a result, researchers switched away from secure or insecure to
how secure. Thus, quantitative information flow analysis came into being
and is attracting more and more interest. It actually calculates how much
information is leaked by observing the low output(s) which may interfere with
the secret high input(s) and this makes more sense compared to qualitative
information analysis. Quantitative information flow analysis is what this
thesis is focused on.
Given any deterministic program, once the input is fixed, the output can
be determined. Thus the deterministic program can be viewed as a function
transforming its input into its output. Since the input of a program can take
many values according to a probability distribution, similarly, the program
can also be viewed as a function transforming the distribution of input into
the distribution of its output. In the context of quantitative information flow,
probability distributions are used by Shannon’s entropy definition to repre-
sent information. As the public input of the program is usually known, it is
considered to contain no information (with probability mass one). Therefore,
once the information contained in the secret input of the program and that
12
in the output of the program are accounted for respectively, the difference
between them is the information leaked by the program and this is the basic
idea of quantitative information flow analysis.
1.1.1 Information Leakage Definition
The first step towards quantitative information flow analysis is the definition
of information leakage. There have been quite a few versions of definitions
[25, 11, 51, 57, 43, 60, 4]. Of them, some use Shannon’s information theory
to define the leakage [25, 11], some use learning theory [57], some use process
algebra [4] and some use differences in processes [60].
The idea of applying Shannon’s information theory to quantify informa-
tion leakage is not new, as it was pioneered by Denning in the 1970’s [24,
25, 27, 26]. Later, Millen [51] built the first formal correspondence between
non-interference and mutual information, while in [50], McLean introduced
time into the analysis. Clark, Hunt and Malacaria (CHM) [15, 16, 14, 12, 11]
use conditional entropy to correct Denning’s measure of information leakage
(please refer to Page 50 for the deficiencies of Denning”s definition). Ap-
proaching from a different angle, recently, Clarkson, Myers and Schneider
have proposed to quantify information flow using beliefs [57]. Lowe’s defini-
tion of information flow [43] uses the process algebra CSP, and is based upon
counting the number of different behaviors of a high level user that can be
distinguished by a low level user.
A simple example (direct flow) to show how to actually calculate the
leakage using CHM’s definition is as follows:
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Example 1.1.1. L := H
Suppose H is an uniformly distributed 4 bits variable, before the exe-
cution of this program, the low variable L contains 0 bits of information,
after the assignment it contains all 4 bits of H, hence there is an information
leakage of 4 bits.
The reader should note that unlike non-interference, there isn’t a standard
definition of information leakage in the information flow community, therefore
all the work mentioned above argues the validity and suitability for their own
definition of information leakage.
The next step is to develop a framework in which quantitative information
analysis can be readily automated. Such a framework should be practical,
sound, as accurate as possible and hopefully widely applicable. However,
not much effort has been put into the development of such a systematic
framework. The only work on such a framework, to the best of our knowledge,
is Clark, Hunt and Malacaria’s work [12, 11]. Their framework is based
on a set of inference rules defined for different commands and operations
which can be used to deduce an upper bound of information leakage after
the command’s execution. Details and examples are discussed in Chapter 3.
We must point out that (quantitative) flow analysis is not complete, and
this can be illustrated by a straightforward example:
Example 1.1.2. P ;Y := X
where P is any program not involving X, and X is a high variable and
Y is a low variable.
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The amount of information leaked into Y is larger than 0 iff P terminates.
Thus a complete flow-analyzer would allow us to solve the halting problem.
Hence our work is not trying to make (quantitative) information flow
analysis complete. Instead, our work takes CHM’s work as a starting point
and tries to improve the accuracy of their framework while making sure it is
still sound.
The deficiency of CHM’s framework is that they analyze high variables
independently no matter what relationship may exist between them. The
basic idea of their analysis when it tries to determine an upper bound for the
total information leakage is just to add all the source information together,
no matter whether there is any duplicated information or not. A simple
example can demonstrate the problem:
Example 1.1.3.
X := Y ;
Z := X + Y
After X := Y , X and Y are actually equivalent to each other; they
contain exactly the same information as each other. Hence X + Y should
just contain as much information as either X or Y . However, CHM’s work
analyzes that Z contains double information of X ( or Y ) by simply adding
the information of X and Y together which are exactly the same as each
other, hence the problem is given the name of “double counting”. Examples
and discussion of the “double counting” problem are in Chapter 3.
In our work, the maximum information of each individual high variable
is known, and the problem of CHM’s framework is improved by taking lin-
ear constraints (captured by abstract interpretation) among high program
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variables into account (in the simple example above, it is X == Y ), and
transforms them into a constraint in our problem. Our idea is that the to-
tal amount of information that can be leaked is the joint entropy of all the
high program variables, instead of the sum of the information of all the high
variables, this can be worked out as a constrained optimization problem by
applying the Lagrange multiplier method. In the simple example above, the
joint entropy H(X, Y ) of X and Y is the same as either H(X) or H(Y ) given
that X == Y . More details are in Chapter 5. This piece of construction
is the effort to make the original framework of CHM’s more accurate as the
relationships between program variables are taken into account.
The result of our work is a quantity which is the maximum joint entropy
of linearly related program high variables. Although the aim of this thesis
is not to develop a specific information flow policy, our result can be useful
to help guide the design of such policy. For example, if when executing
a program, it always leaks the maximum amount of information, then the
policy can certainly rule it as insecure.
1.2 Abstract Interpretation for Linear Con-
straints Detection
As we mentioned before, abstract interpretation is used for automatic linear
constraints detection in our work.
The theory of abstract interpretation was developed by Patrick and Rad-
hia Cousot in the late 1970s [17]. An abstract interpretation is defined as
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a non-standard (approximated) program semantics obtained from the con-
crete one by replacing the concrete domain of computations and its concrete
semantic operations with an abstract domain and corresponding abstract
semantic operations respectively. It is applied to program source code to
infer an approximation of the program’s run-time behavior by carrying out
a static analysis. The most important issue about abstract interpretation is
its soundness, which means that if a property holds in the concrete program,
it should also gets hold by the abstract interpretation of the program.
Let’s take the example of parity to see how abstract interpretation works.
In this case, the concrete domain is the set of integers and the abstract
domain is the set of {0, 1}.
All the even numbers are abstracted as 0 and all the odd numbers as 1,
the abstract semantics would be
0±♯ 0 = 0; 1±♯ 1 = 0; 1±♯ 0 = 0±♯ 1 = 1
0×♯ 0 = 0; 1×♯ 1 = 1; 0×♯ 1 = 1×♯ 0 = 0
where ±♯ denotes the abstract semantic operations of either + or −. For
example, if the program contains just one single assignment: X := X ∗ 2,
then the abstract analysis should give us the final result of X to be 0 because
the abstract semantics gives us both 0×♯ 0 = 0 and 1×♯ 0 = 0 .
The application of abstract interpretation for automatically capturing lin-
ear constraints was pioneered by Cousot and Halbwachs [22]. In this case,
the concrete domain is the set of stores (mapping from program variables to
integers) and the abstract domain is the set of linear constraints over the pro-
gram variables. Each kind of command,i.e. assignment, if statement, while
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loop, has a particular abstract specification of how to derive the linear con-
straint(s) after the command’s execution given the input linear constraints.
For example, suppose the input assertion to an assignment is defined by


X2 ≥ 1,
X1 +X2 ≥ 5,
X1 −X2 ≥ −1
If the assignment is X2 := X1 + 1, the abstract interpretation of deriving
linear constraints for this type of assignment is to eliminates X2 in the input
constraints and adjoin the assignment itself in the resulting constraints, in
more detail, if we substitute X2 with X1 + 1 in each of the above three in-
equalities, we get X1 ≥ 2, together with the reformulated original assignment
X2 −X1 = 1, we get the following constraints after the assignment:


X1 ≥ 2,
X2 −X1 = 1
More details about it and other examples are presented in Chapter 3.
1.3 Scope and Contributions
In this section, the contribution of our work is highlighted, and the scope
and limitation of our work is discussed.
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1.3.1 Scope
The core of this thesis is an improvement of the quantitative information
analysis framework originally proposed by Clark, Hunt and Malacaria [12,
11]. By comparing our work with theirs we show that our method can make
the analysis more precise. Also it can be built into the original analysis to
reason about programs written in the simple while language, and it should
also be able to apply to real languages such as Java or C++. However, it
has not been applied to large pre-existing programs (thousands of lines).
Our analysis is static, as opposed to [48, 49], which is dynamic and gives
an upper bound of information leakage of one particular execution under a
specified input provided by the user on pre-existing programs. Their upper
bound is only valid for that particular execution, and it is possible that
another run of the program will leak more information than this. By contrast,
our result is an universal upper bound, which is suitable for any input and
round of execution of the program.
Our work is useful for systems that satisfy some information flow policy,
i.e. allow certain portion of secret data to flow within the system.
However, please note that information leakage from other aspects are not
our concern, i.e. memory allocation, termination, running time and etc.
Also the type of linear constraints that we can make use of is a linear
inequality constraint (e.g. X ≤ Y ), non-linear constraints between program
variables cannot be dealt with in [22], hence out of the scope of our work as
well.
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1.3.2 Contribution
The main contributions of this thesis are as follows:
• We integrate abstract interpretation into quantitative information flow
analysis. More precisely, the linear constraints between program vari-
ables are explored and made advantage of to improve the precision of
the quantitative information flow analysis.
• We propose to use joint entropy of high variables to represent the max-
imum amount of information that a program can leak.
• We are able to provide an analytical formula of how to construct the in-
put probabilistic distribution that corresponds to the maximum amount
of the information leakage, given linear constraints and non-linear con-
straints. Although our work can be put into the area of convex opti-
mization, however, except least-squares problems and linear programs,
it is widely accepted that there is in general no analytical formula for
the solution of convex optimization. Thus, our result is both encour-
aging and promising.
• We extend the application of the Lagrange multiplier method to the
field of quantitative information flow, especially to the derivation of an
input probability distribution that has the largest possible information
leakage under given marginal entropy constraints. Although the idea of
the application of the Lagrange multiplier method has been introduced
in [45, 10, 9, 8], the only constraint they consider is a simplex constraint:
i.e. all the probabilities of an input sum up to one, thus the input
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probability which can give rise to the maximum information leakage is
the uniform distribution, which is a very basic (and very old) result in
information theory. In contrast, we use the Lagrange multiplier method
to solve more complicated non-linear constraints (marginal entropy).
1.4 Organization of the Thesis
The reminder of this thesis is structured as follows:
• Chapters 2 to 4 constitute a reference to the underlying mathematical
background and the inspiration of our research.
– Chapter 2 is the introduction of Shannon’s information theory
with simple examples. The definitions of different entropies, mu-
tual information and chain rules are introduced, the relationship
among them is explored. These are the foundation of quantita-
tive information analysis as the information leakage calculation
is defined using one of the entropies (e.g. conditional entropy).
Moreover, as the joint entropy represents the sum of the infor-
mation that high variables can have, this is the total amount of
information that can ever be leaked, so in our work we try to place
an upper bound on this quantity.
– Chapter 3 reviews the developments of quantitative information
flow and abstract interpretation respectively. In particular, the
disadvantage of the current framework of CHM’s is illustrated by
a straightforward example and a possible solution, by taking into
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account linear constraints among programs, is proposed. Since lin-
ear constraints can be nicely captured by abstract interpretation,
hence our research idea is to make use of it.
• Chapter 4 contains two parts: the first part is the main technique
we used in our work that is the Lagrange multiplier method, and the
theory and examples showing its application; the second part is the
introduction of convex optimization, since mathematically the problem
we try to solve belongs to this category. However, the speciality of our
problem is pointed out and discussed.
• Chapters 5 and 6 constitute the main body of this thesis.
– Chapter 5 discusses the maximization of joint entropy under one
single entropy constraint, together with linear constraint(s) be-
tween program variables. We show how the partition version of
entropy definition can be used to facilitate the derivation of the
Lagrange multiplier method; and finally a rigorous mathematical
formula is derived which constructs the probability distribution
that maximizes the joint entropy under those constraints. More-
over, we show that the problem can be boiled down to search for
a suitable α, which is a parameter taking positive real numbers.
– Chapter 6 extends Chapter 5 by considering two marginal en-
tropy constraints. The Lagrange multiplier method is still used
to deduce an analytical form for constructing the joint probability
distribution which gives the maximal joint entropy. The problem
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is further broken down to search for feasible marginal probability
distributions which satisfy marginal entropy constraints, which
can be further broken down to search for a pair of parameters α
and β. In addition, we identify situations where there is no corre-
sponding α or β, and these are usually when one of the marginal
entropies (or both) hits its (their) maximum. We use examples to
compare our result with that of the original CHM’s framework.
• Chapter 7 concludes and provides some suggestions for future investi-
gations.
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Chapter 2
Background of Information
Theory
This chapter covers some basic notions of probability distribution, informa-
tion theory and the Lagrange multiplier method. All of them are very broad
topics, especially information theory, so we only review the most relevant
concepts to this thesis. We introduce definitions of different entropies and
their relationship between each other, in more detail.
2.1 Probability
A discrete random variable takes values from a countable set of specific val-
ues, each with some probability greater than zero; a continuous random
variable takes values from an uncountable set, and the probability of any
subset of values is positive.
The classical definition of the probability of an event occurring is defined
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as the number of favorable cases for the event, over the number of total
outcomes possible in an equiprobable sample space. The formal definition of
discrete probability is:
Definition 2.1.1. Suppose a random variable X which can take all its pos-
sible values in a sample space Ω = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} in the classical sense,
then for each x ∈ Ω, a probability value p(x) is attached, which satisfies the
following properties [23]:
• p(x) ∈ [0, 1] for all x ∈ Ω
• ∑x∈Ω p(x) = 1
Thus, probability is a value between 0 and 1, and p(x) sums up to 1 over
all the values in the sample space. An event is defined as any subset S of the
sample space Ω. The probability of the event S is defined as
P (S) =
∑
x∈S
p(x)
The function p(x) mapping a point in the sample space to the probability
value is called a probability mass function.
When the sample space is continuous (this is just for completeness, we do
not consider continuous probability in this thesis), the probability is defined
as:
Definition 2.1.2. If the sample space of a random variable X is the set of
real numbers R or a subset, then a function called the cumulative distribution
function f exists, defined as f(x) = p(X ≤ x). That is, f(x) returns the
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probability that X will be less than or equal to x. And it also satisfies the
following [23]:
• f is a monotonically non-decreasing, right-continuous function;
• limx→− inf f(x) = 0
• limx→inf f(x) = 1
Thus, the probability that X is between two points a and b is:
f [a ≤ x ≤ b] =
∫ b
a
f(x)dx
and ∫ inf
− inf
f(x) = 1
A probability distribution identifies either the probability of each value
of an unidentified random variable (when the random variable is discrete),
or the probability of the value falling within a particular interval (when the
variable is continuous).
There are many well known discrete probability distributions, e.g. Bernoulli
distributions, binomial distribution, uniform distribution, geometric distribu-
tion; continuous distributions are logarithmic distribution, Gaussian distri-
bution, continuous uniform distribution, etc. As these distributions are not
the focus of this thesis, here we just introduce the discrete uniform distribu-
tion which is most commonly used:
Uniform distribution assigns equal probability to each outcome of the
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sample space Ω = {x1, x2, . . . , xn}, namely:
∀x ∈ Ω, p(x) = 1
n
2.2 Function
In mathematics a function is a relation between a given set of elements (the
domain) and another set of elements (the codomain), which associates each
element in the domain with exactly one element in the codomain.
A function f : X → Y is surjective (onto) if and only if for every y in
the codomain Y there is at least one x in the domain X such that f(x) = y.
A function is one-to-one if every element of its codomain is mapped to
by at most one element of its domain.
There are two types of functions that are of most interest to us, namely
convex and concave functions:
2.2.1 Convex Function
Definition 2.2.1. A real-valued function f defined on an interval is called
convex, if for any two points x and y in its domain D and any t in [0, 1], the
following condition holds [3]:
f(tx+ (1− t)y) ≤ tf(x) + (1− t)f(y)
Pictorially, a function is called convex if the function lies below the
straight line segment connecting two points, for any two points in the in-
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terval, refer to Figure 2.1:
Figure 2.1: Example of Convex Function
A function is called strictly convex if
f(tx+ (1− t)y) < tf(x) + (1− t)f(y)
for any t ∈ (0, 1) and x 6= y.
A function is midpoint convex on an interval D if
f
(
x+ y
2
)
≤ f(x) + f(y)
2
for all x and y in D.
This condition is only slightly weaker than convexity. However, a contin-
uous function that is midpoint convex will be convex.
A differentiable function of one variable is convex on an interval if and
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only if its derivative is monotonically non-decreasing on that interval.
A continuously differentiable function of one variable is convex on an
interval if and only if the function lies above all of its tangents: f(y) ≥
f(x) + f ′(x)(y − x) for all x and y in the interval.
A twice differentiable function of one variable is convex on an interval if
and only if its second derivative is non-negative; this gives a practical test
for convexity. If the second derivative is positive then it is strictly convex,
but the converse does not hold.
Examples of convex functions include x2, |x|, ex, x log x(for x ≥ 0), etc.
2.2.2 Concave Function
Basically, a function f is concave if −f is convex. Formally,
Definition 2.2.2. A real-valued function f defined on an interval is called
concave, if for any two points x and y in its domain D and any t in [0, 1],
the following holds [3]:
f(tx+ (1− t)y) ≥ tf(x) + (1− t)f(y)
Pictorially, a function is called concave if the function lies above the
straight line segment connecting two points, for any two points in the interval,
refer to Figure 2.2:
Similarly, a function is called strictly concave if
f(tx+ (1− t)y) > tf(x) + (1− t)f(y)
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Figure 2.2: Example of Concave Function
for any t in (0, 1) and x 6= y.
A continuous function on an interval D is concave if and only if
f
(
x+ y
2
)
≥ f(x) + f(y)
2
for any x and y in D.
A differentiable function f is concave on an interval if its derivative is
monotonically decreasing on that interval.
A twice differentiable function of one variable is concave on an interval if
and only if its second derivative is negative.
Examples of concave functions include log x and
√
x for x ≥ 0.
2.3 Partition
The mathematical definition of partition is as follows:
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Definition 2.3.1. Let X be any set. P ⊆ ℘(X) (power set of X) is a
partition of X if
• ⋃P∈P P = X
• for all P1, P2 ∈ P either P1 = P2 or P1 ∩ P2 = ∅
2.4 Information Theory
One of the most important feature of Shannon’s theory is the concept of en-
tropy, which lays the foundation for information theory [67]. In this section,
we will start from the very fundamental concept of entropy which measures
the uncertainty of a random variable. Then the definition of joint entropy
and conditional entropy which are extended notions of entropy are intro-
duced. Joint entropy measures the uncertainty of two or more variables in
combination while conditional entropy measures the remaining uncertainty
of one variable when knowing the other. Moreover, mutual information and
relative entropy are introduced based on joint entropy and conditional en-
tropy. Mutual information measures the amount of information one random
variable contains about the other. Relative entropy represents the difference
in the probability distributions between two random variables. All these con-
cepts are closely related, and we show how they can be deduced from each
other.
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2.4.1 Entropy
In information theory, entropy is used to measure the uncertainty associated
with a random variable.
Definition 2.4.1. Given a discrete random variable X whose values are in
the set X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn}, entropy is defined as [67]
H(X) = −
∑
x∈X
p(x) log p(x)
where p(x) is the probability mass function of random variable X taking
value x. The log is to the base 2 and entropy is expressed in bits. The con-
vention is that 0 log 0 = 0 and 1 log 1 = 0 which can be justified as neither
‘zero’ probability (something guaranteed not to happen) or ‘one’ probability
(something guaranteed to happen) has any uncertainty. Also, it is very clear
from the definition that entropy doesn’t depend on the actual value that ran-
dom variable X may take, it only depends on the probability distributions
of X. Furthermore, entropy is a permutation invariant of probability distri-
bution, in other words, once the probability distribution is fixed, the entropy
is fixed, no matter which possible value of X takes which probability. Also
entropy is always non-negative.
Note that the expectation of X is EX =
∑
x∈X xp(x), if interpreted in
this way, the entropy of X can also be viewed as the expected value of the
random variable − log p(X). Thus,
H(X) = EP [− log p(X)]
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Example 2.4.2. Let
X =


a with probability 1
2
b with probability 1
4
c with probability 1
8
d with probability 1
8
The entropy of X is
H(X) = −1
2
log
1
2
− 1
4
log
1
4
− 1
8
log
1
8
−−1
8
log
1
8
= 1.75 bits
Example 2.4.3. The entropy of a discrete random variable X which can take
n possible values achieves its maximum when its probabilistic distribution is
uniform:
H(X) = log n
We will prove the above conclusion using Lagrange multiplier method in
Chapter 4.
The entropy function is concave, Figure 2.3 demonstrates this property
using a binary random variable.
2.4.2 Joint Entropy
Joint entropy can be viewed as an extension of entropy of a single random
variable, as a pair of random variables (X, Y ) (or more) can be considered
to be a single vector-valued random variable.
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Figure 2.3: Concaveness of Entropy Function
Definition 2.4.4. The joint entropy H(X, Y ) of a pair of discrete random
variables (X, Y ) with a joint distribution p(x, y) where X taking values in the
set X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} and Y taking values in the set Y = {y1, y2, . . . , yn}
respectively, is defined as [23]
H(X, Y ) = −
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(x, y) log p(x, y)
The expectation version of joint entropy can also be expressed as
H(X, Y ) = E[− log p(X, Y )]
Example 2.4.5. Suppose a pair of discrete random variables (X, Y ) have
the following joint distribution as shown in Table 2.1, then the joint entropy
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❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
Y
X
x0 x1 x2
y0 1/6 1/9 1/18
y1 1/9 1/9 1/9
y2 1/3 0 0
Table 2.1: Joint Probabilistic Distribution
H(X, Y ) is:
H(X, Y ) = −∑x∑y p(x, y) log p(x, y)
= −1
6
log 1
6
− 4
9
log 1
9
− 1
18
log 1
18
− 1
3
log 1
3
= 1.9641 bits
2.4.3 Conditional Entropy
Conditional entropy measures the remaining uncertainty of a random variable
given that another related variable Y is known.
Definition 2.4.6. Suppose two random variables X and Y with X taking
values in the set X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} and Y taking values in the set Y =
{y1, y2, . . . , yn} respectively, if the conditional probability is denoted as p(x|y),
then the conditional entropy H(X|Y ) is defined as [23]
H(X|Y ) = ∑y∈Y p(y)H(X|Y = y)
= −∑y∈Y p(y)∑x∈X p(x|y) log p(x|y)
= −∑x∈X ,y∈Y p(x, y) log p(x|y)
Example 2.4.7. Suppose the joint probabilistic distribution is still the one
shown in Table 2.1, then the marginal probabilities for X and Y are {11
18
, 2
9
, 1
6
}
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and {1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
}, the conditional entropy of H(X|Y ) is:
H(X|Y ) = −∑x, y p(x, y) log p(x|y)
= −1
6
log 1
2
− 4
9
log 1
3
− 1
18
log 1
6
− 1
3
log 1
= 1.0147 bits
similarly the conditional entropy of H(Y |X) is:
H(Y |X) = −∑x, y p(x, y) log p(y|x)
= −1
6
log 3
11
− 1
9
log 2
11
− 1
3
log 6
11
− 2
9
log 1
2
− 1
18
log 1
3
− 1
9
log 2
3
= 1.2524 bits
It is very clear from this example that
H(X|Y ) 6= H(Y |X)
which means in general the uncertainty left for X knowing Y is not the same
as the other way around.
Both joint entropy and conditional entropy measures some kind of uncer-
tainty between two random variables, naturally one may wonder if there is
any relationship between them, and this is proved by the following theorem:
Theorem 2.4.8 (Chain Rule).
H(X, Y ) = H(X) +H(Y |X)
H(X, Y ) = H(Y ) +H(X|Y )
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Proof. We prove H(X, Y ) = H(Y ) +H(X|Y ), and the other can be proved
in the same way.
H(X, Y ) = −∑x∈X∑y∈Y p(x, y) log p(x, y)
= −∑x∈X∑y∈Y p(x, y) log p(y)p(x|y)
= −∑x∈X∑y∈Y p(x, y) log p(y)−∑x∈X∑y∈Y p(x, y) log p(x|y)
= −∑y∈Y p(y) log p(y)−∑x∈X∑y∈Y p(x, y) log p(x|y)
= H(Y ) +H(X|Y )
2.4.4 Relative Entropy
The relative entropy is a measure of the distance between assuming proba-
bilistic distribution q while the true distribution is p.
Definition 2.4.9. The relative entropy between two probability mass func-
tions p(x) and q(x) is defined as [23]
D(p||q) =
∑
x∈X
p(x) log
p(x)
q(x)
In the above definition, we use the convention that 0 log 0
0
= 0, 0 log 0
q
= 0
and p log p
0
=∞. Thus, if there is any symbol x ∈ X such that p(x) > 0 and
q(x) = 0, then D(p||q) =∞. Relative entropy is always non-negative, and is
zero if and only if p = q. However, it is not symmetric and does not satisfy
the triangle inequality. Nonetheless, it is often useful to think of relative
entropy as a “distance” between distributions.
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Example 2.4.10. Let X={0, 1} and consider two distributions p and q on
X . Let p(0) = 1− r, p(1) = r and let q(0) = 1− s, q(1) = s. Then
D(p||q) = (1− r) log 1− r
1− s + r log
r
s
and
D(q||p) = (1− s) log 1− s
1− r + s log
s
r
If r = 1
2
, s = 1
4
, we can calculate
D(p||q) = 1
2
log
1
2
3
4
+
1
2
log
1
2
1
4
= 0.2075 bits
whereas
D(p||q) = 3
4
log
3
4
1
2
+
1
4
log
1
4
1
2
= 0.1887 bits
2.4.5 Mutual Information
Mutual information is another important concept in information theory. It
measures the uncertainty shared between two random variables. It can also
be viewed as the relative entropy between the joint distribution p(x, y) and
the product distribution p(x)p(y).
Definition 2.4.11. Suppose two random variables X and Y which taking
values in sets X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} and Y = {y1, y2, . . . , yn} respectively
and associated with a joint probability mass function p(x, y) and marginal
probability mass functions p(x) and p(y). The mutual information I(X;Y )
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is defined as [23]:
I(X;Y ) = ∑x∈X∑y∈Y p(x, y) log p(x,y)p(x)p(y)
= D(p(x, y)||p(x)p(y))
Note that if X and Y are independent from each other, then
p(x, y) = p(x)p(y)
In this case log p(x,y)
p(x)p(y)
= log 1 = 0, therefore, mutual information I(X;Y ) =
0. This makes sense as independent random variables don’t share any infor-
mation between each other.
Theorem 2.4.12. The relationship between mutual information and entropy
is:
I(X;Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y )
Proof.
I(X;Y ) = ∑x, y p(x, y) log p(x,y)p(x)p(y)
=
∑
x, y p(x, y) log
p(x|y)
p(x)
= −∑x, y p(x, y) log p(x) +∑x, y p(x, y) log p(x|y)
= −∑x p(x) log p(x)− (−∑x, y p(x, y) log p(x|y))
= H(X)−H(X|Y )
Thus, the mutual information I(X;Y ) is the reduction in the uncertainty
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of X due to the knowledge of Y . By symmetry, it also follows that
I(X;Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y |X)
Thus, X contains as much uncertainty about Y as Y contains about X, in
other words,
I(X;Y ) = I(Y ;X)
Proof.
I(X;Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y |X)
= H(Y )−H(X, Y ) +H(X)
= H(X) +H(Y )−H(X, Y )
= H(X)−H(X|Y )
= I(Y ;X)
Since H(X, Y ) = H(X) +H(Y |X), as shown in Theorem 2.4.8, we have
I(X;Y ) = H(X) +H(Y )−H(X, Y )
Collecting the above results, the following theorem holds:
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Theorem 2.4.13 (Mutual Information and Entropy).
I(X;Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y )
I(X;Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y |X)
I(X;Y ) = H(X) +H(Y )−H(X, Y )
I(X;Y ) = I(Y ;X)
I(X;X) = H(X)
Figure 2.4 shows the relationship between entropy and mutual informa-
tion more clearly.
Figure 2.4: Relationship between entropy and mutual information
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Example 2.4.14. Suppose the joint probabilistic distribution is still the one
shown in Table 2.1, from the computation of conditional entropy, we know
that H(X|Y ) = 1.0147 bits, and H(Y |X) = 1.2524 bits. The marginal
entropy for X and Y are {11
18
, 2
9
, 1
6
} and {1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
}. Then
H(X) = H(11
18
, 2
9
, 1
6
) = 1.3472 bits
H(Y ) = H(1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
) = 1.5847 bits
Thus,
I(X;Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y )
= 1.347223− 1.014703
= H(Y )−H(Y |X)
= 1.584963− 1.252443
= 0.3325 bits
Like conditional entropy, there is conditional mutual information whose
definition is as follows:
Definition 2.4.15. The conditional mutual information of random variables
X and Y given Z is defined as [23]
I(X;Y |Z) = H(X|Z)−H(X|Y, Z)
=
∑
x, y, z p(x, y, z) log
p(x,y|z)
p(x|z)p(y|z)
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2.4.6 Chain Rules for Joint Entropy, Relative Entropy
and Mutual Information
It is interesting to see that the joint entropy of a collection of random variables
is the sum of the conditional entropies.
Theorem 2.4.16 (Chain Rule for Entropy). Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be drawn
according to p(x1, x2, . . . , xn). Then
H(X1, X2, . . . , Xn) =
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|Xi−1, . . . , X1)
Proof. Applying the mathematical induction:
Base case - when n = 2:
H(X1, X2) = H(X1) +H(X2|X1) holds
Suppose that when n = k it also holds, namely:
H(X1, X2, . . . , Xk) =
k∑
i=1
H(Xi|Xi−1, . . . , X1)
When n=k+1:
H(X1, X2, . . . , Xn) = H(X1, X2, . . . , Xk, Xk+1)
= H(X1, X2, . . . , Xk) +H(Xk+1|X1, X2, . . . , Xk)
=
∑k
i=1H(Xi|Xi−1, . . . , X1) +H(Xk+1|X1, X2, . . . , Xk)
=
∑k+1
i=1 H(Xi|Xi−1, . . . , X1)
It also holds when n = k + 1, thus, it holds for all n.
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There is also a chain rule for mutual information.
Theorem 2.4.17 (Chain Rule for Information). Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn and Y
all be random variables, then
I(X1, X2, . . . , Xn;Y ) =
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y |Xi−1, Xi−2, . . . , X1)
Proof.
I(X1, X2, . . . , Xn;Y ) = H(X1, X2, . . . , Xn)−H(X1, X2, . . . , Xn|Y )
=
∑n
i=1H(Xi|Xi−1, . . . , X1)−
∑n
i=1H(Xi|Xi−1, . . . , X1, Y )
=
∑n
i=1 I(Xi;Y |X1, X2, . . . , Xi−1)
Finally we show the chain rule for relative entropy.
Theorem 2.4.18 (Chain Rule for Relative Entropy). Suppose two random
variables X and Y and two different probability mass functions p and q:
D(p(x, y)||q(x, y)) = D(p(x)||q(x)) +D(p(y|x)||q(y|x))
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Proof.
D(p(x, y)||q(x, y)) = ∑x∑y p(x, y) log p(x,y)q(x,y)
=
∑
x
∑
y p(x, y) log
p(x)p(y|x)
q(x)q(y|x)
=
∑
x
∑
y p(x, y) log
p(x)
q(x) +
∑
x
∑
y p(x, y) log
p(y|x)
q(y|x)
= D(p(x)||q(x)) +D(p(y|x)||q(y|x))
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Chapter 3
Literature Review: Motivation
of Our Research
This chapter explains the main motivation of our research, namely one of
the key weaknesses of the existing CHM’s framework—the “double count-
ing” problem, which will be explained in Section 3.1.4 and demonstrated by
some examples; then a feasible solution addressing the problem is proposed,
that is by adopting an abstract interpretation-based analysis to improve the
precision of quantitative information flow analysis.
Quantitative information flow analysis and abstract interpretation, by
themselves, are both very broad and active research areas although quanti-
tative information flow analysis is relatively new compared to abstract inter-
pretation. For the sake of completeness and to familiarize the reader with
the necessary basis and development of these two areas, brief introductions of
them are included before we discuss the weakness of the current quantitative
information flow analysis framework and explain how it can be improved us-
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ing one specific kind of abstract interpretation analysis. However, we do not
want to make this chapter self-contained, so for more detailed information
about them, readers are advised to refer to wider literature on these two top-
ics. For quantitative information flow analysis, just naming a few, look at the
work of Clark, Hunt and Malacaria [11, 13, 12, 16, 14, 15, 37, 44]; while for
abstract interpretation, please start with the work of Cousot [18, 19, 22, 20],
Jones and Neilson [39].
The rest of this chapter is divided into two main parts: quantitative
information flow analysis and abstract interpretation. They are introduced
in turn.
3.1 Quantitative Information Flow Analysis
The traditional mechanism to protect secure information is access control,
however, it is well established that access control cannot control the prop-
agation of the secure information once it is released from the source when
access is granted in the first place.
Moreover, more and more information security breaches have the form
of transferring secrecy to unauthorized parties. A popular example is “spy-
ware”: you have received a program from an untrusted source, say M. M
promises to help you to optimize your personal financial investments, which
is the private information you have stored in a database on your home com-
puter. The software is free (for a limited time) under the condition that you
permit a log-file containing a summary of your usage of the program to be
automatically emailed back to the developers of the program (who claim they
47
wish to determine the most commonly used features of their tool). Is such
program safe to use? Can you ensure that M is not obtaining your sensitive
private financial information by cunningly encoding it in the contents of the
innocent-looking log-file [66, 40]? Note that the traditional access control
method fails here since the program M has legitimate access to the private
database. Actually, these are the situations which require a much stronger
policy, namely information flow control [64]. This policy should enable us to
track how information flows within the program; access control, while useful,
cannot identify these processes and hence isn’t suitable for information flow
control.
Thus researchers turn to information flow security to reason about how
information actually flows within the system.
Quantitative information flow analysis, as its name suggests, not only
confirms whether there is any information leakage at all, but also, if there is,
it calculates the amount of the information that can be or is leaked.
3.1.1 The Origination of Quantitative Information Flow
Analysis
Before quantitative information flow analysis, the analyses of information
leakage of computer program (system) were all qualitative, which means it
simply tells whether there is any information leaked or not. This is, most of
the time, not as useful as knowing how much information has been leaked.
Meanwhile, in order to enforce the absolute security of computer program
(system), non-interference policy was proposed by Goguen and Messeguer in
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1982 [30] which states that confidential data may not interfere with (affect)
any public data. In other words, the public output cannot reflect any change
of the confidential data, they are totally independent from each other. This
policy is problematic, as it judges far too many programs to be “insecure”,
for example a password checking program does leak a small amount of infor-
mation:
if H==L then
access;
else
deny
fi
if the attacker observes deny, they will know his (her) guess of l is wrong.
The defect of non-interference policy is elegantly put in [62]:
In most non-interference models, a single bit of compromised information
is flagged as a security violation, even if one bit is all that is lost. To be
taken seriously, a non-interference violation should imply a more significant
loss. Even . . . where timing is not available, and a bit per millisecond is
not distinguishable from a bit per fortnight . . . a channel that compromises
an unbounded amount of information is substantially different from one that
cannot.
It is this inherent defect of qualitative information flow analysis — overly
strict, that leads to the origination of quantitative information flow analysis.
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3.1.2 The Development of Quantitative Information
Flow Analysis
Quantitative information flow analysis can be dated back to Denning’s work
in the 1970’s [24, 25, 27, 28, 26], later other definitions continuously come
up [50, 31, 51, 11, 57, 43]. In [24], Denning pioneered the application of in-
formation theory to quantify the information leakage of programs, in which
she demonstrated the analysis of calculating leakage of a few particular as-
signments and if statements by using Shannon’s entropy. However, later her
definition of information leakage was demonstrated to be flawed and since
then quite a lot of work in the field of quantitative information flow analysis
focused on developing the “correct” definition for information leakage calcu-
lation, in such a way that either the new definition satisfies the requirement
of some particular situation, e.g. covert channel [43], while loop [44] etc;
or the new definition is claimed to be capable of sitting in more situations
than the existing ones [57]. Next, some typical definitions of quantitative
information leakage are introduced. We start from Denning’s definition.
Denning’s Definition
Denning’s work [24] defined the information flow as follows: given two pro-
gram variables x, y in a program P and two states s, s′ in the execution
of P , there is a flow of information from x at state s to y at state s′ if un-
certainty about the value of x at s given knowledge of y at s′ is less than
uncertainty about the value of x at s given knowledge of y at s, mathemati-
cally H(xs|ys)−H(xs|ys′) > 0. However, it is established that her measure,
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although seeming quite natural, is arguably flawed, because the observation
of y at s′ does not necessarily contain more information of x than that at s
as the second term H(xs|y′s) accounts for the final observation of x but effec-
tively assumes that the initial observation of y has been forgotten. This is a
safe assumption only if we know that the observer has no memory. However,
we must assume that the observer knows both the initial and final values of
y in general [12].
McLean’s Definition
In [50], McLean introduced time into the analysis of the notion of secure
information flow. His model is highly abstract, and it states that a system is
secure if p(Lt|(Hs, Ls)) = p(Lt|Ls), where Lt describes the value taken by the
low system objects at time t while Ls andHs are the sequences of values taken
by the low and high objects, respectively, at times preceding t. McLean’s
flow model provides the right security model for a system with memory.
However, his work is actually qualitative and there is not enough machinery
to implement an analysis based on it [12] since his work is intended to provide
a way for evaluating security models rather than a means of evaluating real
systems.
Gray’s Definition
The use of conditional mutual information in the context of information leak-
age was proposed by Gray [31], however, his work is not aimed at measuring
information leakage but to define it for a flow model. Such work also include
Volpano and Smith’s [70] which showed that well-typed programs cannot leak
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confidential data in polynomial time.
Clark, Hunt and Malacaria’s (CHM’s) Definition
Clark, Hunt and Malacaria have done a lot of work quantifying the actual
information leakage [15, 14, 16, 12, 11] using information theory explicitly.
Their system model is essentially McLean’s [50], and the quantity they es-
timate was first defined by Gray [31] in the context of a channel capacity
theorem. For example, their analysis will give the information leakage of the
following programs as the maximum k bits and 1 bit respectively (suppose
H is a k (k is a positive integer) bit variable):
• L = H
• if H == 0 then L = 1; else L = −1; fi
More details of their definition and analysis will be discussed in the next
section.
Later Malacaria [44] gave a more precise quantitative analysis of loop
constructs. He defined an information theoretical formula for leakage of the
command while e M in which both the amount and the rate of leakage are
calculated. Following this work, Chen and Malacaria [7] recently presented
a mechanism for quantitative leakage analysis for multi-threaded programs.
The basic idea was based on program transformation: the multi-threaded
program with a probabilistic scheduler is transformed to a single-threaded
program with probabilistic operators, and then the leakage of the transformed
program can be computed using the formula of [44].
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Other Definitions
Recently, some people proposed other definition of information leakage. Dif-
ferent from all the definitions above, Clarkson, Myers and Schneider have
proposed to quantify the information flow using beliefs [57]. Their idea is to
monitor how the attacker’s belief changes upon their observations of outputs
of a (probabilistic) program. If before executing the program, the attacker
believes the secret is overwhelming to be something, and when the program
is terminated and the observer finds out that the secret is something else,
then it is claimed that there is a large amount of information leaked to the
attacker. CMS’ definition of information as belief is objective which de-
pends on the initial guess of the attacker, so it seems that the more wrong
the attacker’s pre-belief is, the more information they would get from the
post-belief.
Other Related Work
Di Pierro, Hankin, and Wiklicky [61] used the notion of approximate nonin-
terference to conceptualize an “up to ǫ” noninterference. They introduced
a quantified measure of the similarity between two processes in a process
algebra. It is measured using the supremum norm of the difference matrix
of probabilistic state transition matrices the processes create. This quan-
tity, as they demonstrated, is linked with an attacker’s ability to distinguish
two processes. Finally, the paper showed an abstract interpretation that al-
lows approximation of the confinement of a process. Their more recent work
[60] generalized this to measure the confinement in probabilistic transition
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systems and gave well-understood examples.
McCamant and Ernst [47] developed an approach to track the use of
data through arbitrary calculation in programs to determine how much in-
formation about secret inputs was revealed by the public outputs. It was
shown that an implementation of such techniques based on dynamic binary
translation on C, C++ and object-oriented programs can provide meaningful
security checks.
In another recent paper [69], Smith reviewed the existing definitions of
quantitative information flow, and refined the security bound given by Fano’s
inequality. He proposed a new conceptual foundation of “vulnerability” and
proposed to use the min-entropy in Renyi entropy instead of Shannon’s en-
tropy to measure the information leakage.
Discussion
While there is not an universally accepted definition of information leakage,
the application of entropy from information theory to quantify information
flow seems common. And there are still researchers investigate the advan-
tage and disadvantage of each definition mentioned above and propose new
definitions, however, in our research we will adopt the definition of CHM’s
because it is quite natural and objective when it comes to the real world
problem of information flow.
54
3.1.3 The Framework of Quantitative Information Flow
Analysis
Most of the work in the field of quantitative information flow analysis men-
tioned above only deals with the definition of information leakage which does
not provide a systematic, formal framework to analyze quantitative informa-
tion flow; however, Clark, Hunt and Malacaria developed a whole analysis
framework for quantifying information flow. Their analysis is presented as
a set of syntax-directed inference rules, and there is some attempt to auto-
mate it [56]. In the beginning, their framework worked for a simple language
without loops and there are also some constraints on the equality test ( e.g.
it can only test against constants) [11]; later, they improved their analy-
sis framework by including while loops and made use of some mathematical
properties [12] to make the analysis more precise. This section introduces
the main ideas of their analysis framework.
The rules they present are intended to derive bounds on the leakage of a
variable at a program point, given only assumptions on the entropy of the
confidential variable at the entry point. Such assumptions actually give very
limited knowledge of the distribution of input values and this means that a
direct calculation of the leakage at a program point is usually impossible.
Main Idea
The ultimate aim of quantitative information analysis is to place an upper
bound on the amount of information that can be leaked through the program.
The information leakage they are concerned with is the information that may
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be leaked from private variables to public ones. In other words, they are
modeling a situation in which the environment delivering high inputs to the
program is trusted, even though the program itself is not. This is appropriate
for example in the analysis of untrusted code which is to be downloaded and
run on a user’s computer, where the user is the owner of the confidential
data.
Their programs are written in while language, which contains just the
following control constructs: assignment, while statements, if statements
and sequential composition; the left hand side of assignment are variable
identifiers while the right hand side are integer or boolean expressions; while
loops and if statements involve boolean expressions in the standard way;
expressions in their language define total functions on stores. The syntax of
the while language is standard and hence omitted here.
The program they consider is deterministic, so for any given program P ,
the semantics induces a partial function [[P ]] : Σ→ Σ, where Σ is the domain
of stores, which is a finite map from variable names to k-bit integers (in the
range −2k−1 ≤ n ≤ 2k−1) and booleans.
The variables of a program P are partitioned into two sets, H (high)
and L (low). High variables may contain confidential information when the
program is run, but these variables cannot be examined by an attacker at any
point before, during or after the program’s execution. Low variables do not
contain confidential information before the program is run and can be freely
examined by an attacker before and after (but not during) the program’s
execution.
The main idea of their analysis is: as they are interested in how much
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of the information carried by the high inputs to a program can be learnt
by observation of the low outputs, assuming that the low inputs are known.
Since the language is deterministic, any variation in the outputs is a result of
variation in the inputs. Once the knowledge of the program’s low inputs is
accounted for, the only possible source of surprise in an output is interference
with high inputs.
Given a program variable (or set of program variables) X, let X l and Xw
be, respectively, the corresponding random variables on entry to and exit
from the program (termination is assumed), the measure of the amount of
leakage into X due to the program is:
L(X) =def H(Xw|Ll)
In order to systematically analyze the information leakage, at each pro-
gram point a random variable corresponding to observations of the low vari-
able at that point is defined. When it comes to while loop, the use-definition
graph (UDG), a directed graph whose nodes are program points, is used to
identify the source nodes of all possible information which flows into some
certain program point of the while loop, the details of how the identification
works is omitted here as it is not the scope of this thesis, however, please
refer to [12] for detailed explanation.
They also noticed that low program variables are hard to be counted for,
as either there will be little or no knowledge available for the low variables
or the distribution for low inputs may actually be in the control of attackers.
To cope with this problem, they work with an interval which is the bound
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of the entropy representing the range of information that can be leaked to
the observable program variable at each program point, and the final in-
formation leakage from the high inputs to the low outputs can be obtained
automatically using their inference rules which are introduced in the next
sub-section.
Inference Rules
Here we gave a basic idea as how exactly the analysis framework of CHM’s
works. The following are some of their inference rules as shown in Table
3.1. Where B(q) = −q log q − (1− q) log(1− q) and Uk(q) = −q log q − (1−
q) log 1−q
2k−1
. The expression analysis rules have the form Γ ⊢ E : [a, b] where
Γ is a partial function from Var to real-valued pairs (representing intervals)
of the form [a, b] with a ≤ b. The meaning of a rule Γ ⊢ E : [a, b] is that
the expression E has information leakage in the interval [a, b] assuming that
the leakage of each variable x in E lies in the interval Γ(x). If [ , b] is used,
it means the upper bound of information leakage of E is b (the lower bound
doesn’t matter), in other words, it means E leaks at most b bit(s) information
and similarly for [a, ] which means the lower bound of information leakage
of E is a, namely at least a bit bit(s) information is leaked by E.
From the table we can see that no matter what the exact inference rule
it is, without any exception, it embodies the concept that the total amount
of information that can be leaked cannot exceed the information that has
flowed into the system.
We summarize how their analysis works for a whole program: their anal-
ysis calculates bounds on the best and worst cases for leakage over the com-
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DP
n1 ⊢ [E(n1)] ≤ b1, . . . , nk ⊢ [E(nk)] ≤ bk
n ⊢ [E] ≤∑ki=1 bk
EConj
Γ ⊢ E : [a1, b1] Γ ⊢ E : [a2, b2]
Γ ⊢ E : [max(a1, a2),min(b1, b2)]
BConj
Γ ⊢ B : [a1, b1] Γ ⊢ B : [a2, b2]
Γ ⊢ B : [max(a1, a2),min(b1, b2)]
k-Bits
Γ ⊢ E : [0, k] 1-Bit Γ ⊢ B : [0, 1]
Const
Γ ⊢ n : [0, 0] Var Γ, x : [a, b] ⊢ x : [a, b]
And
Γ ⊢ Bi : [ , bi] i = 1, 2
Γ ⊢ (B1 ∧B2) : [0, b1 + b2]
Neg
Γ ⊢ B : [a, b]
Γ ⊢ ¬B : [a, b]
Plus
Γ ⊢ Ei : [ , bi]
Γ ⊢ (E1 + E2) : [0, b1 + b2]
Eq(1)
Γ ⊢ E1 : [ , b1] Γ ⊢ E2 : [ , b2]
Γ ⊢ (E1 == E2) : [0, b1 + b2]
Eq(2)
Γ ⊢ E1 : [a, ] Γ ⊢ E2 : [ , b]
Γ ⊢ (E1 == E2) : [0,B(q)]
1
2k
≤ q ≤ 1
2
, Uk(q) ≤ (a− b)
If
Γ ⊢ e : [ , b] Γ ⊢ ci ↓ x : [ , bi]
Γ ⊢ if e then c1 else c2 ↓ x : [0, b+ b1 + b2]
Table 3.1: Leakage inference: Expressions
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plete set of possible input values for the low variables, thus the leakage of
the program is within the range H−(Xw|Ll) ≤ H(Xw|Ll) ≤ H+(Xw|Ll)
where H−(Xw|Ll) is minH(XL=l) and H+(Xw|Ll) is maxH(XL=l) and then
the final information leakage by the program is obtained by applying the
corresponding inference rule at each program point.
Let’s take a look at an example:
Example 3.1.1.
if Y = 0 then
X := 0;
else
X := 1;
fi
with Y high-security variable and X low-security variable to see how the
inference rules work. Suppose Y is a 32-bit variable and the input distribution
makes Y uniform over its 232 possible values and independent of X. The
analysis can start with Γ0 = X : [0, 0], Y : [32, 32]. The rules presented above
are easily seen to derive: Γ0 ⊢ Y = 0 : [ǫ, ǫ] (where ǫ = B(1\232) ≈
7.8× 10−7). Thus , using if , we can derive: Γ0 ⊢ c ↓ X : [0, ǫ].
In later work [12, 15], more mathematical properties have been explored,
and hence more precise inference rules such as [ZeroMult] and [OddMult]:
ZeroMult
n ⊢ [E1 ∗ E2] = 0
E2 = 0
OddMult
n ⊢ [E1] ∼ a n ⊢ [E2] ∼ a
n ⊢ [E1 ∗ E2] ∼ a
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where ∼ can be any of ≤, =, ≥. Please note that these rules together with
the inference rules above only work outside the while loops. They use UDG
to identify all the possible sources of information that flows into the while
loop with which their analysis is very conservative, which was later improved
further by Malacaria’s work [44].
3.1.4 The Weakness of Quantitative Information Flow
Analysis—“Double Counting”
Although Clark, Hunt and Malacaria’s framework is systematic, their anal-
ysis is too conservative in some sense. Let’s take a contradicting example to
demonstrate the problem:
X := Y ;
Z := X + Y
Suppose that both X and Y are high variables and Z is the low observable
variable. Suppose both H(X) = a and H(Y ) = b hold before entering the
program, then after the execution of X := Y , using the [DP] inference rule
above, we can deduce that H(X) = H(Y ) = b. Then by applying the [Plus]
inference rule, we can finally have H(Z) = H(X) +H(Y ) = 2b.
Although this example is very straightforward and yet a little bit extreme,
it demonstrates the problem of “double counting” very clearly which exists
in the CHM’s analysis framework. Without any way of incorporating the
relationship between program variables together, the best that can be said
about the total amount of information that can be leaked by a program is
the sum of the information of all the possible sources (except in some very
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special cases e.g. [ZeroMult]), even though some parts of this information
are exactly the same as each other, hence the name of “double counting”.
If we look at the above simple program again, it is not hard to notice
that actually X and Y become equivalent to each other, hence their infor-
mation is entirely shared. Adding them together doesn’t double the amount
of information as they contain exactly the same information as each other.
Therefore, Z does not contain twice the information as either X or Y , actu-
ally it contains exactly the same information as either of them.
A more general example would be:
X1 := X2 := . . . = Xn;
X :=
∑
iXi
If we apply CHM’s analysis framework without taking into account the fact
that Xis are all equivalent, it is ended up with X having n times the infor-
mation as that of Xi, when n is sufficiently large, it would deduce that X
has a very large amount of information (suppose the memory is sufficiently
large and X can contain infinite bits) which is clearly much too imprecise.
Thus, this simple example gives us the hint that relationships between
program variables can be used to deduce more precise quantitative informa-
tion leakage analysis. For example in the above program, if the relationship
of X1 == X2 == . . . == Xn can be successfully incorporated into the anal-
ysis, then no matter how large n is, the information content of X should be
determined to be equal to that of any single Xi.
Luckily there is a well developed framework to obtain this kind of relation-
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ship (constraints) between program variables, namely abstract interpretation,
which will be introduced in the next section.
3.2 Abstract Interpretation
There are some specific techniques in the area of abstract interpretation which
can nicely approximate the linear relationship between program variables
[19, 6, 68]. Before we go into details about it, a simple introduction of the
basics of abstract interpretation is presented.
3.2.1 Intuition
Generally speaking, abstract interpretation refers to the name that applies
to quite a few techniques for reasoning about programs by evaluating them
over non-standard domains whose elements denote properties of the standard
domain. The intuition behind abstract interpretation is: when it comes to
program analysis, it is time-consuming and often impossible trying to analyze
programs running on all possible inputs of all possible paths; and also we
are only interested in some certain properties of the program which can be
abstracted, or these properties already can tell us everything we need to know
about the program. For example, instead of handling sets of integers, one
might want to over-approximate them using an interval. If all computations
are done monotonically, the result interval is necessarily a superset of the
exact set of possible values at the end of execution.
There are so many applications of abstract interpretation in real life, for
example the most common one of “the rule of sign” in which all the positive
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numbers are denoted by “+”, all the negative as “-” and “?” as unknown
meaning it can be either positive or negative. And the abstract semantics
defines (+) +♯ (+) = +, (−) +♯ (−) = −, (+) +♯ (−) =?, (+) −♯ (−) =
+, (−)−♯ (+) = − and etc where +♯ means the abstract addition while −♯ is
the abstract subtraction. Next we use a little bit complicated example than
this to illustrate the usefulness of abstract interpretation in practice.
Example of Abstract Interpretation—the “Casting Out Nines”
We adopt the classical example of “casting out nines” (mod 9) from [1]
to illustrate how abstract interpretation can be used to check whether a
complicated calculation is correct or not within seconds of time. Consider
the following calculation:
123 ∗ 457 + 76543 =? = 132654
The abstract interpretation technique does the check in this way: the above
is checked by reducing 123 to 6, 457 to 7, and 76543 to 7, and then reducing
6*7 to 42 and so further to 6, and finally 6+7 is reduced to 4. This differs
from 3, the sum modulo 9 of the digits of 132654 so the calculation was
incorrect. The method abstracts the actual computation by only recording
values modulo 9. Even though much information is lost, useful results are
still obtained since this implication holds: if the alleged answer modulo 9
differs from the answer got by casting out nines, there is definitely an error.
The mathematical proof of this method is not hard, and we omit it for the
sake of space here.
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More formally, here the abstraction is α(x) = x mod 9 and the corre-
sponding concretization is γ(a) = {x|x mod 9 = a}. The abstract operators
are x+♯ y = (x+ y) mod 9 and x ∗♯ y = (x ∗ y) mod 9.
Another thing we can see from the example is that abstract interpretation
simulates many computations at once. As an example, the abstract value 6
actually represents a set of integer numbers with the same property that their
module 9 is 6.
3.2.2 Formal Definition
Formally, abstract interpretation is a theory of sound approximation of the
semantics of computer programs, based on monotonic functions over ordered
sets. It has been formalized by Cousot and Cousot [17, 18] for flow-chart
language. Moreover their work has had a considerable impact on later work
in various areas, of which related to information flow analysis includes David
Monniaux’s work on abstract interpretation of probabilistic programs [54,
55, 53], Hunt and Mastroeni’s work on abstract non-interference [38, 46] and
etc.
First let’s introduce partially ordered set (poset) and monotone function.
Poset
A poset is a pair (P,≤) where P is a set, and ≤ is a partial order (a reflexive,
transitive and anti-symmetric relation) on P. That is ∀x, y, z ∈ P :
• x ≤ x (reflexive)
• x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ x ⇒ x = y (anti-symmetric)
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• x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ z ⇒ x ≤ z (transitivity)
Monotone Function
Let A and B be posets. A map f : A → B is monotone if a ≤ a′ ⇒ f(a) ≤
f(a′).
Formal Definition of Abstract Interpretation
Let A and C be two posets, namely abstract domain and concrete domain
respectively.
A function α is called an abstract function if it maps an element x in the
concrete domain C to an element α(x) in the abstract domain A.
A function γ is called an concretization function if it maps an element x′
in the abstract domain C to an element γ(x′) in the concrete domain A.
Correctness of Abstract Interpretation
No matter how abstract the abstract domain is, correctness (soundness) of
the analysis is central. In other words we must be able to prove that the
properties resulting from the abstract analysis are satisfied by the values
that the standard semantics operates on.
For example, if we have an abstraction for the simple arithmetic operation
X := X ∗ 2 given that X is an integer, and each variable X is abstracted as
its parity (abstract domain of (even , odd or not known), then the correctness
of the abstract analysis will ensure a final abstract value of X even or not
known (either even or odd), but if the analysis give us X odd as the final
value, then it is wrong.
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More precisely, the values obtained from the standard semantics should
be in the set of concretization of the corresponding abstract property. As
soundness is not the main topic of this thesis, it is only briefly mentioned
here although it is vital.
Let C1, C2, A
′
1 and A
′
2 be ordered sets. The concrete semantics f is a
monotonic function from C1 to C2. A function f
′ from A′1 to A
′
2 is said to
be a sound abstraction of f if for all x′ ∈ A′1, (f · γ)(x′) ≤ (γ · f ′)(x′).
3.2.3 Application of Abstract Interpretation
To make abstract interpretation of any use, first of all an abstract domain
has to be decided on which nicely identifies the property of interest. The
most common are numerical abstract domains, such as the simplest interval
[17], more complex convex polyhedron (linear (in)equality) [19, 35, 36, 32, 33]
and other domains [52].
The application of abstract interpretation usually consists of computing a
fixed point for the program on the abstract domain. This usually involves an
iterative process, generating a sequence of approximations to the post fixed
point of the program and checking for convergence on each iteration. Hence,
consideration must be given to the operations required to compute the fixed
point, or at least some useful approximation of the fixed point. Monotonicity
is a requirement of fixed point equations, therefore the structure of abstract
domains ranges from posets to complete lattices. When analyses are defined
over abstract domains with infinite or very long chains, they may require
a technique that either forces or accelerates convergence. The notion of
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widening and narrowing were introduced to manage such situations and are
reviewed in [21].
Widening and Narrowing
A widening is an operator on two successive iterations in a fixed point calcu-
lation over increasing chains that approximate a post fixed point. The loss
in precision is compensated for by operational tractability, as in practice,
post fixed point can be easier to compute than fixed points. The following
definitions are due to [21].
Definition 3.2.1. A widening denoted
`
, on the posets 〈P,≤〉 is defined by
`
: P × P → P such that ∀x, y ∈ P. x ≤ x` y and ∀x, y ∈ P. y ≤ x` y
and for all increasing chains x0 ≤ x1 ≤ . . ., the increasing chain defined by
y0 = x0, . . . , yi+1 = yi
`
xi+1 is not strictly increasing, that is yl+1 ≤ yl for
some l.
For example, the widening operates on the abstract domain of integer
intervals works as follows:
[a1, b1]
h
[a2, b2] =
[if a2 < a1 then −∞ else a1,
if b2 > b1 then +∞ else b1]
Example 3.2.2.
[1, 10]
h
[1, 11] = [1,+∞]
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[1,+∞]
h
[0, 12] = [−∞,+∞]
Narrowing, denoted
a
, is a similar technique that is applied to decreasing
chain.
Definition 3.2.3. A narrowing denoted
a
, on the posets 〈P,≤〉 is defined
by
a
: P × P → P such that ∀x, y ∈ P. (y ≤ x) ⇒ y ≤ (xa y) ≤ x
and for all decreasing chains x0 ≥ x1 ≥ . . ., the decreasing chain defined by
y0 = x0, . . . , yi+1 = yi
a
xi+1 is not strictly decreasing, that is yl+1 ≥ yl for
some l.
Similarly, narrowing operates on abstract domain of intervals:
[a1, b1]
i
[a2, b2] =
[if a1 == −∞ then a2 else MIN(a1, a2),
if b1 == +∞ then b2 else MIN(b1, b2)]
Example 3.2.4.
[−∞,+∞]
i
[−∞, 101] = [−∞, 101]
[−∞, 101]
i
[0, 100] = [0, 100]
[0, 100]
i
[0, 99] = [0, 99]
In the next section, how abstract interpretation can be used to easily
derive linear constraints between program variables is introduced. The cor-
rectness proof is omitted for the sake of space, however, it is guaranteed by
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the soundness of general abstract interpretation.
3.2.4 Abstract Interpretation for Linear Constraints
Detection
The abstract domain of our analysis is integer polyhedra, the advantage of
this domain is that it contains the relationship between variables.
Now we introduce how abstract interpretation can be used to automat-
ically deduce linear constraints (convex polyhedron) between program vari-
ables. The work was first proposed by Cousot and Halbwachs [22]. Later, a
refined widening for polyhedra proposed in Cousot and Halbwachs’ paper is
reported in [32, 33]. They demonstrated that it is possible to lose less infor-
mation by reformulating the first polyhedron so that the number of common
constraints is maximized. More recent work on polyhedrons is that of Howe
and King [35, 36]. They proposed an abstract interpretation on finite do-
main of constraint logic programs. By allowing the propagation of linear
constraints at compile time as a program specialization that preserves the
semantics of the original program, the search space is reduced and problem
solving is expedited. Some of the analyzed programs exhibited a significant
execution time improvement. Other works directly on integer polyhedra are
[68, 6] of which the latest is [6].
In [68], set of finite sets of linear inequalities as abstract domain is pro-
posed where each inequality contains at most two variables with unrestricted
coefficients (e.g. coefficients ∈ R). This is the domain which is richer than
intervals as it is relational. They exploit a way to decompose the original set
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into a series of projections, one for each two dimensional plane, by doing so,
all the operations can be expressed in terms of two dimensional case which
proves to be efficient. The set of linear inequality constraints our algorithm
can deal with don’t necessarily have to have this neat form, namely it can
contain more than two variables.
In [6], how to derive the most precise integer polyhedra of a system of
inequalities is discussed. The integer polyhedron is grown step by step, first
an integer solution satisfying the set of linear constraints are calculated, then
a distinct solution which has the maximal distance from the previous solution
is calculated. Then a convex hull of this point and the previous space is taken
and the process is iterated until it reaches the dimension of the final solution.
To avoid the problem of ending up with an unmanageably large number of
inequalities, a Monte Carlo approximation of the number of integer points
that a constraint bars from a polyhedron is calculated. The least contributing
constraints are relaxed.
In our analysis, we need to derive a new set of linear constraints from the
set of linear constraints before the assignment. [68, 6] don’t deal with the
transformation of the linear constraints directly. However, we can directly
apply [22] to get the linear constraints. [6] can be used on the linear constraint
set after the assignment to get the most precise integer polyhedron. In the
next subsection, how it works is detailed.
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3.2.5 Algorithm for deriving linear constraints of as-
signment
In this section we specify how to derive linear constraints for assignments
based on the type of the assignment.
Basically, there are two types of assignments: invertible assignment and
non-invertible assignment. For example X2 := X1+X2/2+ 1 (X1, X2 ∈ N )
is invertible as X2 can be recovered by subtracting X1+1 and then times the
result by 2 while X2 := X1+1 is non-invertible as it can not be recovered in
the same way.
Suppose we have a system of linear constraints before the assignment:


c11x1 + . . .+ c1nxn ≥ b1
. . .
cm1x1 + . . .+ cmnxn ≥ bm
Where bi, ci,j ∈ R.
If the assignment is non-invertible, xi = c
′
1x1 + c
′
2x2 + . . . + c
′
i−1xi−1 +
c′i+1xi+1 + . . .+ c
′
nxn (c
′
i ∈ R ).
The derivation of the linear constraints after this assignment would be:
to substitute each xi in the original constraints with c
′
1x1 + . . .+ c
′
i−1xi−1 +
c′i+1xi+1 + . . .+ c
′
nxn, then put the assignment itself as one of the constraint
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as well:


c11x1 + . . .+ c1i(c
′
1x1 + . . .+ c
′
i−1xi−1 + c
′
i+1xi+1 + . . .+ c
′
nxn) + c1(i+1)xi+1 + . . .+ c1nxn ≥ b1
. . .
cm1x1 + . . .+ c
′
mi(c
′
1x1 + . . .+ c
′
i−1xi−1 + c
′
i+1xi+1 + . . .+ c
′
nxn) + c1(i+1)xi+1 + . . .+ cmnxn ≥ bm
xi = c
′
1x1 + c
′
2x2 + . . .+ c
′
i−1xi−1 + c
′
i+1xi+1 + . . .+ c
′
nxn
And then simplify the above system to give the final result.
If the assignment is invertible, xi = c
′
1x1 + c
′
2x2 + . . . + c
′
ixi + . . . + c
′
nxn
The derivation of the linear constraints after this assignment would be: first,
rename each of the variable at the right hand side of the assignment, e.g.
x1 = x
′
1, xn = x
′
n, then replace each variable in the original constraints with
its renamed one, thus the constraints after the assignment are:


c11x
′
1 + . . .+ c1i(c
′
1x
′
1 + . . .+ c
′
ix
′
i + . . .+ c
′
nxn) + c1(i+1)x
′
i+1 + . . .+ c1nx
′
n ≥ b1
. . .
cm1x
′
1 + . . .+ cmi(c
′
1x
′
1 + . . .+ c
′
ix
′
i + . . .+ c
′
nx
′
n) + c1(i+1)x
′
i+1 + . . .+ cmnx
′
n ≥ bm
Simplification may be needed. Please note that the work of Chapter 5
and 6 are all based on this.
Here we adopt the example from [22] to demonstrate how to derive linear
constraints for assignment.
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Example 3.2.5. suppose the input assertion to an assignment is defined by


X2 ≥ 1,
X1 +X2 ≥ 5,
X1 −X2 ≥ −1
if the assignment is non-invertible such as X2 := X1+1, the output assertion
would be just getting rid of X2 from the original set of inequalities, add the
assignment itself to the new set as well:


X1 ≥ 2,
X2 −X1 = 1
if the assignment is invertible such as R2 := R1+R2/2+1, then the output
assertion is obtained by reformulating R1 as R
′
1 and R2 as 2R
′
2 − 2R′1 − 2
then substitute back to the original input assertion:


2X ′2 − 2X ′1 ≥ 3,
2X ′2 −X ′1 ≥ 7,
−2X ′2 + 3X ′1 ≥ −3
Thus, for our simple example of:
X := Y ;
Z := X + Y ;
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either representation will easily give the result of:
• Before entering the program, no information is obtainable about the
linear constraint of either X or Y ;
• After the first assignment, it is {X − Y = 0};
• After the second assignment, it is {Z −X − Y = 0, X − Y = 0}.
This example is too simple to actually need to use abstract interpreta-
tion to work out the linear constraints between program variables. However,
abstract interpretation is very powerful, as it can identify those linear con-
straints among the variables that never appear explicitly in the program con-
text, and often escape the notice of anyone who is studying it. The following
is such an example [22]:
{P0} I := 2; J := 0;
{P1} L :
{P2} if . . . then
{P3} I := I + 4
{P4} else
{P5} J := J + 1; I := I + 2;
{P6} fi
{P7} go to L;
The inequality representation will give the approximation of linear re-
straints as:
• (0): no information
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• (1): I=2, J=0
• (2), (3), (5): 2J+2≤I, J≥0
• (4): 2J+6≤I, J≥0
• (6): 2J+2≤I, J≥1
• (7): 2J+2≤I, 6≤I+2J, J≥0
3.3 Case study-ComparisonWith CHM’s Anal-
ysis
In this section we use some examples to show the usefulness of abstract
interpretation where CHM’s analysis falls short.
3.3.1 Program with Single Linear Constraint
Example 3.3.1.
X := Y ;
Z := X + Y ;
already demonstrates the point that abstract interpretation can provide
useful information which CHM’s analysis is not capable of. Basically the
CHM’s analysis can claim that the information leaked into Z is the sum
of that of X and Y , that is H(Z) = H(X) + H(Y ) if both X and Y are
high program variables; while the abstract interpretation can infer the con-
straint X = Y which can then be used to establish H(X) = H(Y ), and
the maximum joint entropy of X and Y is Hmax(X, Y ) = H(X) = H(Y ),
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finally the maximum amount of information that can be leaked into Z is
H(Z) = H(X) = H(Y ).
3.3.2 Program with Multiple Linear Constraints
The following program (Example 3.3.2) has more than one linear constraint
between high program variables X and Y (as shown in Figure 3.1). The
abstract interpretation is expected to derive the following linear constraints:
suppose there isn’t any other constraint of X and Y , then after the if state-
ment, abstract interpretation is expected to derive X + Y ≥ 5, X − Y ≥ −1;
after the assignment of Y := X + Y
2
+ 1, it is 2Y − 2X ≥ 3, 2Y − X ≥
7, −2Y + 3X ≥ −3. Suppose H(X) = a, we would expect the maximum
joint entropy of X and Y to be between a and the result of CHM’s simply be-
cause neither are X and Y independent from each other (as treated in CHM’s
framework) nor they have such a close relationship that they are equivalent
to each other as in Example 3.3.1; our analysis demonstrated in details in
Chapter 5 Section 5.7 confirms this while the best of CHM’s analysis can do
is still the same as claiming that the sum of information of X and Y will be
leaked into Z which is a+ log n (suppose Y can have n values) .
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Example 3.3.2.
if X + Y ≥ 5 && X − Y ≥ −1 then
Z := 0;
else
X = 3;
Y = 4;
fi
Y := X + Y
2
+ 1;
Z := f(X, Y );
Where f(X, Y ) is some linear function of X and Y . This program is
discussed in detail in Chapter 5 Section 5.7.
3.3.3 A While Loop
Now let’s use a simple While loop program to show the point again, and
the linear constraint between X and Y that can be obtained by abstract
interpretation is demonstrated in Figure 3.2.
Example 3.3.3.
while X ≤ Y
Z := 0;
Z := X + Y ;
X := X + 1;
end while
with X and Y , each can take integer values in the range of [1, . . . , n], and
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Figure 3.1: Polyhedron for Example 3.3.2 with horizontal axis being X and
vertical axis being Y
the marginal constraint H(Y ) = a.
CHM’s analysis will first conduct a dependence analysis which is very
conservative, and just tells that Z depends on X and Y , hence the maximum
information that can be leaked into Z is the sum of the largest amount of
information of X and Y ; our analysis, on the other hand, can use the result
of abstract interpretation of X ≤ Y , although it is not precise, to derive
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a better upper bound of information leakage which is smaller than CHM’s.
Our analysis can be improved if the abstract interpretation is able to derive
tighter linear constraints. Detailed discussion is also in Chapter 5 Section
5.7.
Figure 3.2: Polyhedron for Example 3.3.3 with horizontal axis being X and
vertical axis being Y
Discussion
From above, it is clear that abstract interpretation is a very powerful method
to obtain linear constraints between program variables; moreover, it can also
be automated to detect such properties. As has been demonstrated in the
last section, a more precise information leakage may be obtained if linear
constraints between program variables is considered during the quantitative
information analysis. Therefore, our idea is to use abstract interpretation to
get approximate linear constraints between program variables and then use
this information to improve the analysis framework of quantitative informa-
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tion flow proposed by Clark, Hunt and Malacaria which starts from Chapter
5.
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Chapter 4
Lagrange Multiplier Method
and Convex Optimization
This chapter introduces the key technique that is used to derive the maximum
joint entropy in our work, the Lagrange multiplier method, which is a very
powerful mathematical tool to solve constrained optimization problem. Then
convex optimization is discussed, since the problem we are trying to solve
belongs to this special category of constrained optimization, however, the
speciality of our problem is pointed out.
4.1 Lagrange Multiplier Method
Lagrange multiplier method is a very popular and useful mechanism for con-
strained mathematical optimization. It provides a strategy for finding the
maximum (minimum) of a function subject to constraints. The basic idea
behind it can be seen from geometric point of view: the contour of the objec-
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tive function we want to maximize(minimize) should touch the boundary of
the constraint function in such a way that they are tangent to each other at
one point which is exactly the maximum (minimum). This is demonstrated
in Figure 4.1 [2].
Figure 4.1: Lagrange multiplier Method
Mathematically, suppose we want to maximize the function f(x, y) sub-
ject to the constraint h(x, y) = b. The method of Lagrange multiplier works
by first introducing an auxiliary function Λ(x, y, λ) to incorporate the con-
straint into one equation:
Λ(x, y, λ) = f(x, y)− λ (h(x, y)− b)
and solve the partial derivatives of Λ(x, y, λ) in terms of x, y, λ respectively:
▽x,y,λΛ(x, y, λ) = 0
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Formally, let Λ(x∗, λ) (x∗ is a vector of variables) be the Lagrangian of a
function f subject to a family of constraints C1≤i≤m (where Ci ≡ hi(x) = bi),
i.e.
Λ(x∗, λ) = f(x∗)−
∑
1≤i≤m
λi(hi(x
∗)− bi)
The Lagrange multiplier method is justified by the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1.1. Assume the vector x∗ = (x1, . . . , xn) maximizes (or mini-
mizes) the function f(x) subject to the constraints (hi(x) = bi)1≤i≤m. Then
either
1. the vectors (▽hi(x
∗))1≤i≤m are linearly dependent, or
2. there exists a vector λ∗ = (λ1, . . . , λm) such that
▽Λ(x∗, λ∗) = 0, i.e.
(
∂Λ
∂xi
(x∗, λ∗) = 0
)
1≤i≤n
,
(
∂Λ
∂λi
(x∗, λ∗) = 0
)
1≤i≤m
where ▽ is the gradient.
The theorem also applies to functions with more than one variable.
For the technique of Lagrange multiplier method to work, the domain
of f should be an open set containing all points satisfying the constraints.
Furthermore, f and the gi must have continuous first partial derivatives and
the gradients of the gi must not be zero on the domain.
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4.1.1 Simple Example of Lagrange Multiplier Method
Here is an example of how exactly Lagrange multiplier method works, which
can be found in mathematics textbooks involving the subject, such as [2]:
Suppose we want to maximize
f(x, y) = 10− (x− 5)2 − (y − 3)2
under the constraint g(x, y)
x+ y = 1
First we rewrite the constraint as
g(x, y)− c = x+ y − 1 = 0
Then we construct the Lagrangian:
Λ(x, y, λ) = f(x, y)−λ(g(x, y)−c) = 10− (x−5)2− (y−3)2−λ(x+y−1)
Note that λ may be either added or subtracted although we choose to use
subtraction in this thesis.
Partial derivatives of Λ of x, y, λ respectively are taken which gives us
the following set of equations:
∂Λ
∂x
= −2x+ 10− λ = 0 (4.1)
∂Λ
∂y
= −2y + 6− λ = 0 (4.2)
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∂Λ
∂λ
= x+ y − 1 = 0 (4.3)
solving above equations: max(f(x, y)) = f(x = 3
2
, y = −1
2
) = −14.5.
4.1.2 Entropy Example
It is well known that uniform distribution gives the maximum entropy and
this can also be easily derived by applying Lagrange multiplier method:
The objective function is entropy:
f(p1, p2, . . . pn) = −
n∑
i=1
pi log pi
And there is one simple constraint that
g(p1, p2, . . . pn)− c =
n∑
i=1
pi − 1 = 0
The Lagrangian is constructed as follows:
Λ(p1, p2, . . . , pn, λ) = f(p1, p2, . . . , pn)−λ(g(x, y)−c) = −
n∑
i=1
pi log pi−λ(
n∑
i=1
pi−1)
For each pi, partial derivative of the Lagrangian gives:
(
1
ln 2
+ log pi) + λ = 0
Thus all the pi are equal to
1
n
.
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4.2 Convex Optimization
Convex optimization is a special kind of non-linear optimization. In this
section we introduce the definitions of convex optimization followed by a
discussion of why our problem cannot be solved using traditional convex
optimization algorithms or techniques although it is in the form of convex
optimization.
4.2.1 Basic Definition
A set C is convex if the line segment between any two points in C lies in C,
i.e., if for any x1, x2 ∈ C and any 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, we have
λx1 + (1− λ)x2 ∈ C.
A convex optimization problem is one of the form
minimize f0(x)
subject to fi(x) ≤ bi, i = 1, . . . ,m; hi(x) = 0, i = 1, . . . , p
where the functions f0, . . . , fm : R
n → R are convex.
The set of points for which the objective and all constraint functions are
defined,
D =
m⋂
i=0
domfi ∩
p⋂
i=1
domhi
is called the domain of the optimization problem. A point x ∈ D is feasible if
it satisfies the constraints fi(x) ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m, and hi(x) = 0, i = 1, . . . , p.
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The optimization problem is said to be feasible if there exists at least one
feasible point, and infeasible otherwise.
The optimal value p∗ of the problem is defined as
p∗ = inf{f0(x)|fi(x) ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m, hi(x) = 0, i = 1, . . . , p}.
x∗ is an optimal point or solves the problem, if x∗ is feasible and f0(x
∗) =
p∗. The set of all optimal points is the optimal set, denoted
Xopt = {x|fi(x) ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m, hi(x) = 0, i = 1, . . . , p, f0(x) = p∗}
Note that the optimal set can be infinite, however in practice, it is enough
to just find one such optimal point.
A feasible point x is locally optimal if there is an R > 0 such that
f(x) = inf{f0(z)|fi(z) ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m, hi(z) = 0, i = 1, . . . , p, ||z−x||2 ≤ R},
or in other words, x solves the optimization problem
minimize f0(z)
subject to fi(z) ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m hi(z) = 0, i = 1, . . . , p ||z − x||2 ≤ R
4.2.2 Least-squares Problem and Linear Programming
Of convex optimization, the most well known and mature techniques are the
least-square problem and linear programming. Unfortunately, our problem
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doesn’t fall into any of the two categories. Here, we basically introduce the
definition of each of them.
Least-square Problem
A least-square problem is a special subclass of convex optimization with no
constraints and an objective which is a sum of squares of terms of the form
aTi x− bi:
minimize f0(x) = ||Ax− b||22 =
k∑
i=1
(aTi x− bi)2
Here A ∈ Rk×n(with k ≥ n), aTi are the rows of A, and the vector x ∈ Rn is
the optimization variable.
Linear Programming
Linear programming is another important class of convex optimization prob-
lems, in which the objective and all constraint functions are linear:
minimize cTx
subject to aTi x ≤ bi, i = 1, . . . ,m.
Here the vectors c, a1, . . . , am ∈ Rn and scalars b1, . . . , bm ∈ R are problem
parameters that specify the objective and constraint functions.
4.2.3 Numeric Algorithms for Convex Optimization
In this section, we introduce some of the most popular numeric algorithms
for solving convex optimization. Let’s first start with the most popular one.
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Newton’s Method
Newton’s algorithm is the most well-known and popular method for solving
unconstrained or equality constraint convex optimization. Here we introduce
how the algorithm works:
Given a starting point x ∈ domf , tolerance ǫ > 0.
repeat:
1. Compute the Newton step decrement.
△xnt := f ′′(x)−1f ′(x); λ2 := f ′(x)Tf ′′(x)−1f ′(x).
2. Stopping criterion. quit if λ2/2 ≤ ǫ.
3. Line search. Choose step size t by backtracking line search.
4. Update. x := x+ t△xnt.
When working with equality constraint(s), it is necessary that the initial
point also satisfies the constraint(s) in addition to belonging to the domain
of the objective function f .
Interior-point Method
Interior-point method is a relatively new algorithm to solve the convex op-
timization problem with inequality constraints. It also makes use of New-
ton’s method in its centering step. Here we introduce one particular kind
of interior-point method, namely the barrier method, whose convergency
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property is proved in [5]. The algorithm works by incorporating inequal-
ity constraints implicitly into the objective function, and then working on a
sequence of equality constraint problem.
Suppose we want to minimize f0(x) subject to fi(x) ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m
and Ax = b, where f0, . . . , fm : R
n → R are convex and twice continuously
differentiable, and A ∈ Rp×n with rank A = p < n.
The barrier method works by first introducing the logarithmic barrier
function Iˆu = −(1/t) log(−u), then the original problem is approximated as:
minimize f0(x) +
∑m
i=1−(1/t) log(−fi(x)) subject to Ax = b.
Then the algorithm works as follows:
Given strictly feasible x, t := t(0) > 0, µ > 1, tolerance ǫ > 0, φ > 0.
repeat
1. Centering step.
Compute x∗(t) by minimizing tf0+φ, subject to Ax = b, starting at x.
2. Update. x = x∗(t).
3. Stopping criterion. quit if m/t < ǫ.
4. Increase t. t := µt.
where strictly feasible means that x∗(t) satisfies the constraints Ax∗(t) = b
and fi(x
∗(t)) < 0, i = 0, . . . ,m, and f0(x
∗(t))− p∗ ≤ m/t. When the initial
strictly feasible point is unknown, the algorithm is extended with phase 1
method in order to find such point to start the algorithm with. For more
details please refer to [5].
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4.2.4 Discussion
Most of the work in convex optimization is concentrated on how to transfer
the original problem to convex optimization, hence it can be solved using
the corresponding algorithms. These transformations work by introducing
new variables or reformulating the original optimization problem, eliminating
constraints and etc.
Our problem doesn’t need to be transformed as it is already in the form
of convex optimization. However, in convex optimization when dealing with
multi-variables, usually the constraints treat each variable as independent
from each other, which is not the case in our problem. Thus, our problem
cannot be solved using traditional convex optimization, or in other words, as
far as we know in convex optimization, there hasn’t been much research into
the type of our problem.
With equality constrained convex optimization, the most popular numeric
algorithm is Newton’s method. However, it depends on providing a feasible
start point which for our problem is quite difficult, sometimes even impossi-
ble. Although there is an algorithm coping with infeasible starting points, it
is only for linear constraints such as Ax = b where A is a m× n matrix, x is
a vector of length n, b is a value. Hence our problem is outside the scope of
Newton’s method.
For the barrier method to work, in addition to the problem of providing
feasible initial point, the type of inequality constraint must be of the form
−H + b ≤ 0, namely we can only work with the lower bound of marginal
entropy constraint, which is usually not the case as we either work with
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equality constraint or upper bound of marginal entropy constraint.
Our algorithm, on the other hand, doesn’t require any initial feasible
points with which the algorithm iteration starts. Instead, our algorithm
searches for a parameter with which the marginal probability distribution
satisfies the marginal entropy constraint. Once the parameter is found, the
maximal joint entropy is obtained thereafter. From the next chapter we
demonstrate how our analytical algorithm works step by step.
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Chapter 5
Single Constraint Joint
Entropy Maximization and Its
Generalization
In previous chapters we summarized the current work on quantitative infor-
mation flow analysis, introduced the background of information theory, ab-
stract interpretation and convex optimization. Most importantly, we demon-
strate how Lagrange multiplier method can solve constrained optimization
problems using some examples.
This chapter starts an analytical discussion on maximizing information
leakage under a single constraint. Here, single constraint means there is only
one non-linear constraint (i.e. marginal entropy constraint). It doesn’t mean
there is one and only one constraint, as the precondition that all probabil-
ities sums up to one is always counted as one constraint. Although it is
always safe to say that the total amount of information that can be leaked
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by program variables will not exceed the sum of their self information (en-
tropy), upper bound as precise as possible is always desired. Constrained
information leakage poses new challenges to quantitative information flow
analysis.
Facing the challenge, we propose a fundamental rigorous algorithm based
on Lagrange multiplier method to quantify the maximum possible informa-
tion that can be leaked by the program. The constraints we consider in this
chapter are of four types, linear and non-linear, equality and non-equality. It
is a very difficult problem, as it is well known that even if it is a convex op-
timization, usually there is no analytical form for the maximization problem
with non-linear constraint [5]. Investigating the single constraint, we found
that by applying the partition version of entropy definition, the derivation
can be made much simpler. This enables us to tailor our algorithm to a much
easier-to-understand procedure.
5.1 Introduction
Our work is based on CHM’s framework of quantitative information flow
analysis. As discussed in Chapter 3, it suffers from the weakness of “double
counting” because it treats programs variables as independent from each
other. Recall the simple extreme example from Chapter 3:
X := Y ;
Z := X + Y ;
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Without noticing X is just a copy of Y , duplicated information is counted
twice in Z.
Therefore, we are inspired by the fact that relationships between program
variables can be used to deduce a more precise upper bound of information
leakage. With the increasing complexity of computer systems, the relation-
ships between program variables are very complicated, not only between high
and low variables, but between high and high, low and low variables as well.
Hence, it is unreasonable to ignore their relationship and treat them as in-
dependent from each other.
Hence, we make the first attempt to look into this problem which will be
explained in the next few sections.
5.2 Quantity to Maximize
Before going into the details of the technique, we first explain the quantity
we choose to maximize—the joint entropy.
As demonstrated by Figure 5.1, joint entropy counts for all the informa-
tion among variables, including the mutual information they share. There-
fore, in quantitative information flow analysis, the joint entropy of all the
secret inputs stands for the total amount of information that may be leaked.
Moreover, the situations we consider here are those when there are more
than one high program variables and they interact with each other via vari-
ous ways. The joint entropy seems to be a quite natural quantity to fit into
this situation.
However, there is no conspiracy to choose to maximize joint entropy.
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Figure 5.1: Relationship between entropy and mutual information
Others may want to maximize the conditional entropy of observable variable
based upon high variables. They are basically two sides of the same coin, as
H(X, Y ) = H(Y )+H(X|Y ) (just take two variables as an example), and the
marginal entropy H(Y ) (or H(X)) is fixed in our problem, thus maximizing
either of the two terms left will maximize the other one.
In the next section, we first use a concrete example to demonstrate how
our algorithm finds out the probability distribution that maximizes the joint
entropy under certain constraints before we move on to the more general
case.
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5.3 Simple Problem
Let’s consider:
Example 5.3.1.
if X ≤ Y then
Z := X + Y ;
else
Z := 0;
fi
with both X and Y being non-negative integers.
The abstract interpretation analysis is expected to give the following
derivation of linear constraints between programs variables:
Suppose before the if statement there isn’t any constraint on the secret
inputs X and Y , then in the truth branch after the non-invertible assignment
of Z := X + Y , it is {X ≤ Y ; Z = X + Y }, and {X ≥ Y + 1, Z = 0} for
the false branch as the assignment is also non-invertible.
The total amount of information leakage would be the sum of three parts
together: the information leakage from the guard if X ≤ Y , from the then
branch, together with that from the else branch.
Suppose Z is the observable output, what is the possible maximum infor-
mation leakage given the constraints obtained from abstract interpretation
analysis? As the maximum leakage of the guard is 1 bit, and Z := 0 has
information leakage zero, thus we only need to consider the maximum infor-
mation that can be leaked through Z := X + Y under constraint X ≤ Y ,
and this is the type of information leakage that this thesis concerns.
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To make derivations as simple as possible in the beginning, let’s assume
that each of them can only take integer values in the range of [1, 3]. Now
let’s add a single marginal entropy constraint H(Y ) = a (it is more or less
the same if the constraint is H(X) = a since X and Y are symmetric in this
case). Then the question is, what is the maximum possible value for their
joint entropy?
In this chapter we use P to denote probability distribution. Let pi,j =
P (X = i, Y = j), qi = P (Y = i). Note that, since X ≤ Y , we may restrict
attention to pi,j such that i ≤ j. Therefore, the objective function we want
to maximize is:
H(X, Y )X≤Y, X,Y ∈[1, 3] = −
∑
i, j∈[1, 3], i≤j
pi,j log pi,j (5.1)
Before constructing the Lagrangian, let’s first introduce the partition ver-
sion of entropy:
Given a distribution P over a set S = {s1,1, s1,2, . . . , sn,m} and a
partition of S into sets (Si)1≤i≤n:
H(P (s1,1), P (s1,2), . . . , P (sn,m)) = H(P (S1), P (S2), . . . , P (Sn))
+
∑n
i=1 P (Si)H(P (si,1)P (Si) ,
P (si,2)
P (Si)
. . .
P (si,m)
P (Si)
)
Note that the marginal probability distribution of Y actually imposes a
partition on the original set of (X, Y ) according to the values of Y , therefore,
we can rewrite the objective function to embody this:
H(X, Y )X≤Y, X,Y ∈[1, 3] = H(q1, q2, q3) +
3∑
i=1
qiH(p1,i
qi
, . . . ,
pi,i
qi
) (5.2)
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In the above equation, as the marginal entropy for Y is fixed (which is a in
this case), in order to get maximal joint entropy, we only need to maximize∑3
i=1 qiH(p1,iqi , . . . ,
pi,i
qi
). It is well known that uniform distribution maximizes
entropy (refer to the example of applying Lagrange multiplier method to
entropy in Section 4.1.2), thus for our problem, uniform distributions in each
part of qi maximizes the joint entropy. As a result the above equation can
be further reduced to:
H(X, Y )X≤Y, X,Y ∈[1, 3] = a+
3∑
i=1
qi log i (5.3)
Thus it is suffices to maximize equation 5.3 subject to the following two
constraints:
H(Y )− a = 0 (5.4)
3∑
i=1
qi − 1 = 0 (5.5)
Now apply the Lagrange multiplier method and define the Lagrangian Λ
as
Λ = a+
3∑
i=1
qi log i− λ1(H(Y )− a)− λ2(
3∑
i=1
qi − 1) (5.6)
which gives rise to the following family of partial derivative equations,
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1 ≤ i ≤ 3:
∂Λ
∂q1
= log 1 +
λ1
ln 2
(ln q1 + 1)− λ2 = 0 (5.7)
∂Λ
∂q2
= log 2 +
λ1
ln 2
(ln q2 + 1)− λ2 = 0 (5.8)
∂Λ
∂q3
= log 3 +
λ1
ln 2
(ln q3 + 1)− λ2 = 0 (5.9)
By subtracting equation 5.7 from equation 5.8 and 5.9 respectively, we can
derive the following:
log 2 = log 1 +
λ1
ln 2
(ln q1 + 1)− λ1
ln 2
(ln q2 + 1) (5.10)
log 3 = log 1 +
λ1
ln 2
(ln q1 + 1)− λ1
ln 2
(ln q3 + 1) (5.11)
hence
log 2 =
λ1
ln 2
(ln q1 + 1− ln q2 − 1) = −λ1 log q2
q1
(5.12)
log 3 =
λ1
ln 2
(ln q1 + 1− ln q3 − 1) = −λ1 log q3
q1
(5.13)
Let α = − 1
λ1
(λ1 6= 0). Then we have:
log
q2
q1
= log(2α) (5.14)
log
q3
q1
= log(3α) (5.15)
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hence
q2 = 2
αq1 (5.16)
q3 = 3
αq1 (5.17)
Then from
∑3
1 qi = 1 we derive:
q1 =
1
Z(α)
(5.18)
q2 =
2α
Z(α)
(5.19)
q3 =
3α
Z(α)
(5.20)
where Z(α) = 1 + 2α + 3α.
We only need to vary α to find suitable a solution satisfying H(Y ) = a
as illustrated in Figure 5.2.
There are two values of α for one given marginal entropy, one positive,
the other negative, however, we only need the positive α, as shown in Figure
5.3, positive α gives larger joint entropy than the corresponding negative one:
Figure 5.2 also shows that marginal entropy monotonically decreases
when positive α increases, which is a very useful observation as it allows
a very simple search for a suitable α for a given marginal entropy constraint
in this region, i.e. a binary search does the job very well.
Now let’s prove the monotonically decreasing property with positive α in
this simple case where Y ∈ [1, 2, 3]:
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Figure 5.2: Marginal Probability Distribution and Marginal Entropy in terms
of α
Proposition 5.3.2. Suppose Y ∈ [1, 2, 3] and the probability P (Y ) of Y
is { 1
Z(α)
, 2
α
Z(α)
, 3
α
Z(α)
}, if 0 ≤ α < α′, then H(Y (α′)) < H(Y (α)) where
Z(α) = 1 + 2α + 3α.
One way of proving that a function monotonically decreases is to show
that its first derivative is less than zero, and we take this approach in our
proof:
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Figure 5.3: Marginal Probability Distribution and Maximal Joint Entropy
in terms of α
Proof.
H(Y (α)) = − 1
Z(α)
log( 1
Z(α)
)− 2α
Z(α)
log( 2
α
Z(α)
)− 3α
Z(α)
log( 3
α
Z(α)
)
= 1
Z(α)
log(Z(α))− 2α
Z(α)
(log 2α − logZ(α))− 3α
Z(α)
(log 3α − logZ(α))
= 1
Z(α)
log(Z(α))− 2α
Z(α)
log 2α + 2
α
Z(α)
logZ(α)− 3α
Z(α)
log 3α + 3
α
Z(α)
logZ(α)
= logZ(α)− α2α
Z(α)
− α3α log 3
Z(α)
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Its first derivative of α is:
H′(Y (α)) = Z′(α)
Z(α) ln 2
− (α2α)′Z(α)−α2αZ′(α)
(Z(α))2
− (α3α log 3)′Z(α)−α3α log 3Z′(α)
(Z(α))2
= Z
′(α)
Z(α) ln 2
− 2α+α2α ln 2+3α log 3+α3α ln 3 log 3
Z(α)
+ (α2
α+α3α log 3)Z(α)′
Z(α)2
= Z
′(α)
Z(α) ln 2
− 2α ln 2+α2α(ln 2)2+3α ln 3+α3α(ln 3)2
Z(α) ln 2
+ α(Z(α)
′)2
(Z(α))2 ln 2
= Z
′(α)
Z(α) ln 2
− Z′(α)+α2α(ln 2)2+α3α(ln 3)2
Z(α) ln 2
+ α(Z(α)
′)2
(Z(α))2 ln 2
= α(Z(α)
′)2−α(2α(ln 2)2+3α(ln 3)2)Z(α)
(Z(α))2 ln 2
As α > 0, we only need to compare (Z(α)
′)2−(2α(ln 2)2+3α(ln 3)2)Z(α)
(Z(α))2 ln 2
and zero:
= (2
α ln 2+3α ln 3)2−(2α(ln 2)2+3α(ln 3)2)(1+2α+3α)
(Z(α))2 ln 2
= 2
2α(ln 2)2+32α(ln 3)2+22α3α ln 2 ln 3−2α(ln 2)2−3α(ln 3)2−22α(ln 2)2−2α3α(ln 3)2−2α3α(ln 2)2−32α(ln 3)2
(Z(α))2 ln 2
= 22
α3α ln 2 ln 3−2α(ln 2)2−3α(ln 3)2−2α3α(ln 3)2−2α3α(ln 2)2
(Z(α))2 ln 2
= −2
α(ln 2)2−3α(ln 3)2−2α3α(ln 2−ln 3)2
(Z(α))2 ln 2
< 0
The first derivative is less than zero, hence the marginal entropy is monoton-
ically decreasing in the range α ∈ [0,+∞).
5.3.1 Three High Variables Case of Simple Problem
In last section, there are only two high variables involved, in this section, we
show how more than two variables can also be derived using our analysis:
In this section, we use X1, X2 and X3 to represent three high variables
such that X1 ≤ X2 ≤ X3 and all of them ∈ [1, 3], pi, qi, rk to represent
P (X1 = i), P (X2 = j), P (X3 = k) respectively, and with single constraint
H(X2) = a (it can be either H(X1) or H(X3)).
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By using the partition version of the entropy definition, we can get:
H(X1, X2, X3) = H(X2) +
3∑
i=1, i≤j, j≤k
qjH(p1,j,j
qj
, . . . ,
pj,j,3
qj
) (5.21)
Similarly as the two high variable case, the uniform distribution in each
part of qj maximizes the joint entropy. As a result the above equation can
be further reduced to:
H(X1, X2, X3) = a+
3∑
j=1
qj log j(4− j) (5.22)
Now together with the constraints of H(X2)−a = 0 and
∑3
j=1 qj−1 = 0,
the Lagrangian is:
Λ = a+
3∑
j=1
qj log j(4− j)− λ1(H(X2)− a)− λ2(
3∑
j=1
qj − 1) (5.23)
which gives rise to the following family of partial derivative equations,
1 ≤ j ≤ 3:
∂Λ
∂q1
= log 3 +
λ1
ln 2
(ln q1 + 1)− λ2 = 0 (5.24)
∂Λ
∂q2
= log 4 +
λ1
ln 2
(ln q2 + 1)− λ2 = 0 (5.25)
∂Λ
∂q3
= log 3 +
λ1
ln 2
(ln q3 + 1)− λ2 = 0 (5.26)
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Then we can derive:
q1 =
3α
Z(α)
(5.27)
q2 =
4α
Z(α)
(5.28)
q3 =
3α
Z(α)
(5.29)
where Z(α) = 3α + 4α + 3α.
Therefore, it ends up searching for a suitable α, the same as the two high
variable case.
The derivation of more high variables is more or less the same as above,
hence the result is also similar.
5.4 General Case of Simple Problem
Now let’s generalize the three-value case in the last section to n values:
More or less the same as above, let X, Y be random variables, each with
range {1, . . . , n} and such that X ≤ Y and pi,j = P (X = i, Y = j) and let
qi = P (Y = i). Since X ≤ Y , we may restrict attention to pi,j such that
i ≤ j only.
Suppose H(Y ) = H(~q) = a. What is the maximum possible value for
H(X, Y ) = H(~p)?
Suppose that a joint distribution satisfies H(~q) = a and maximizes H(~p).
The same reasoning as above shows that pi,j = pi′,j for all i, i
′ ≤ j and hence
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that H(~p) = f(~q), where:
f(~q) = a+
n∑
i=1
qi log i (5.30)
Thus it suffices to maximize f(~q) subject to the constraints:
H(~q)− a = 0 (5.31)
n∑
i=1
qi − 1 = 0 (5.32)
Define the Lagrangian Λ as
Λ(~q) = f(~q)− λ1(H(~q)− a)− λ2(
n∑
i=1
qi − 1) (5.33)
giving rise to the following family of equations, 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
∂Λ
∂qi
= log i+
λ1
ln 2
(ln qi + 1)− λ2 = 0 (5.34)
For 2 ≤ i ≤ n we derive by subtracting partial derivative equation of qi from
that of q1:
log i = log 1 +
λ1
ln 2
(ln q1 + 1)− λ1
ln 2
(ln qi + 1) (5.35)
hence
log i =
λ1
ln 2
(ln q1 + 1− ln qi − 1) = −λ1 log qi
q1
(5.36)
Let α = − 1
λ1
(λ1 6= 0). Lagrange multiplier method, for 2 ≤ i ≤ n
log
qi
q1
= log(iα) (5.37)
108
hence
qi = i
αq1 (5.38)
Then from
∑n
1 qi = 1 we derive, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
qi =
iα
Z(α)
(5.39)
where Z(α) = 1 + 2α + . . .+ nα.
Figure 5.4 shows the shape of marginal entropy with different n:
Figure 5.4: Marginal Probability Distributions of Different n: the bottom
one is n = 4, the top one is n = 10
Now the same as above, let’s prove the property of monotonically de-
creasing in this general case:
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Proposition 5.4.1. Let Y (α) be a distribution for [1, 2, . . . , n] such that
P (Y (α) = i) = i
α
Z(α)
, where Z(α) =
∑
i i
α. If 0 ≤ α < α′, then H(Y (α′)) <
H(Y (α)).
We also show that the first derivative of marginal entropy of Y is less
than zero as in the specific three-value case above, before our formal proof,
let’s prove another proposition which our proof relies on:
Proposition 5.4.2. Suppose 0 < α, then (
∑n
i=1 i
α ln i)2 <
∑n
i=1 i
α(ln i)2
∑n
i=1 i
α
We use mathematical induction to prove this proposition:
Proof. When m = 2:
(
2∑
i=1
iα ln i)2 = (1 ln 1 + 2α ln 2)2 = 22α(ln 2)2
2∑
i=1
iα(ln i)2
2∑
i=1
iα = 2α(ln 2)2(1 + 2α) = 22α(ln 2)2 + 2α(ln 2)2
It is clear that
(
2∑
i=1
iα ln i)2 <
2∑
i=1
iα(ln i)2
2∑
i=1
iα
Thus the conclusion holds when m = 2.
Suppose it also holds when m = k, that is
(
k∑
i=1
iα ln i)2 <
k∑
i=1
iα(ln i)2
k∑
i=1
iα
110
When m = k + 1:
(
∑k+1
i=1 i
α ln i)2 =
(∑k
i=1 i
α ln i+ (k + 1)α ln(k + 1)
)2
=
(∑k
i=1 i
α ln i
)2
+ 2(k + 1)α ln(k + 1)
∑k
i=1 i
α ln i+ (k + 1)2α(ln(k + 1))2
∑k+1
i=1 i
α(ln i)2
∑k+1
i=1 i
α =
∑k+1
i=1 i
α(ln i)2
(∑k
i=1 i
α + (k + 1)α
)
=
∑k+1
i=1 i
α(ln i)2
∑k
i=1 i
α + (k + 1)α
∑k+1
i=1 i
α(ln i)2
=
∑k
i=1 i
α(ln i)2
∑k
i=1 i
α + (k + 1)α(ln(k + 1))2
∑k
i=1 i
α
+(k + 1)α
∑k+1
i=1 i
α(ln i)2
Since (
∑k
i=1 i
α ln i)2 <
∑k
i=1 i
α(ln i)2
∑k
i=1 i
α:
(
∑k+1
i=1 i
α ln i)2 <
∑k
i=1 i
α(ln i)2
∑k
i=1 i
α + 2(k + 1)α ln(k + 1)
∑k
i=1 i
α ln i+ (k + 1)2α(ln(k + 1))2
Therefore, we only need to prove that:
2(k + 1)α ln(k + 1)
∑k
i=1 i
α ln i+ (k + 1)2α(ln(k + 1))2
< (k + 1)α(ln(k + 1))2
∑k
i=1 i
α + (k + 1)α
∑k+1
i=1 i
α(ln i)2
2(k + 1)α ln(k + 1)
∑k
i=1 i
α ln i+ (k + 1)2α(ln(k + 1))2
= (k + 1)α
(
2 ln(k + 1)
∑k
i=1 i
α ln i+ (k + 1)α(ln(k + 1))2
)
(k + 1)α(ln(k + 1))2
∑k
i=1 i
α + (k + 1)α
∑k+1
i=1 i
α(ln i)2
= (k + 1)α
(∑k
i=1 i
α(ln(k + 1))2 +
∑k+1
i=1 i
α(ln i)2
)
= (k + 1)α
(∑k
i=1 i
α(ln(k + 1))2 +
∑k
i=1 i
α(ln i)2 + (k + 1)α(ln(k + 1))2
)
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Since
∑k
i=1 i
α(ln(k + 1))2 +
∑k
i=1 i
α(ln i)2 − 2 ln(k + 1)∑ki=1 iα ln i
=
∑k
i=1 i
α (ln(k + 1)− ln i)2
> 0
Thus
2(k + 1)α ln(k + 1)
∑k
i=1 i
α ln i+ (k + 1)2α(ln(k + 1))2
< (k + 1)α(ln(k + 1))2
∑k
i=1 i
α + (k + 1)α
∑k+1
i=1 i
α(ln i)2
holds.
Therefore, the conclusion holds when n = k + 1, which is:
(
k+1∑
i=1
iα ln i)2 <
k+1∑
i=1
iα(ln i)2
k+1∑
i=1
iα
As a result, the proposition holds for all n.
Now let’s prove Proposition 5.4.1 by showing that the first derivative of
marginal entropy is less than zero:
Proof.
H(Y (α)) = −∑i iαZ(α) log iαZ(α)
= −∑i iαZ(α)(log iα − logZ(α))
= −∑i iαZ(α) log iα +∑i iαZ(α) logZ(α)
= logZ(α)−∑i αiα log iZ(α)
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Its first derivative of α is:
H(Y (α))′ = Z(α)′
Z(α) ln 2
−
P
i(i
α+αiα ln i)Z(α) log i−αiαZ(α)′ log i
(Z(α))2
= Z(α)
′
Z(α) ln 2
−
P
i i
α log iZ(α)+
P
i αi
α ln i log iZ(α)−
P
i αi
α log iZ(α)′
(Z(α))2
= Z(α)
′
Z(α) ln 2
−
P
i i
α ln iZ(α)+
P
i αi
α(ln i)2Z(α)−
P
i αi
α ln iZ(α)′
(Z(α))2 ln 2
=
Z(α)′Z(α)−Z(α)′Z(α)+α((Z(α)′)2−
P
i i
α(ln i)2Z(α))
(Z(α))2 ln 2
=
α((
P
i i
α ln i)2−
P
i i
α(ln i)2
P
i i
α)
(Z(α))2 ln 2
< 0(as α > 0)
which is just Proposition 5.4.2, hence the proof completes.
5.4.1 General Case of Three High Variables Case of
Simple Problem
Now let’s generalize the three high variable case in the last section to n values
instead of 3:
Similarly, let X1, X2 and X3 be three high variables such that X1 ≤ X2 ≤
X3 and all of them ∈ [1, . . . , n], pi, qi, rk to represent P (X1 = i), P (X2 =
j), P (X3 = k) respectively, and with single constraint H(X2) = a (it can be
either H(X1) or H(X3)).
By using the partition version of the entropy definition, we can get:
H(X1, X2, X3) = H(X2) +
n∑
j=1, i≤j, j≤k
qjH(p1,j,j
qj
, . . . ,
pj,j,n
qj
) (5.40)
Similarly as the two high variable case, the uniform distribution in each
part of qj maximizes the joint entropy. As a result the above equation can
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be further reduced to:
H(X1, X2, X3) = a+
n∑
j=1
qj log j(n+ 1− j) (5.41)
Now together with the constraints of H(X2)−a = 0 and
∑n
j=1 qj−1 = 0,
the Lagrangian is:
Λ = a+
n∑
j=1
qj log j(n+ 1− j)− λ1(H(X2)− a)− λ2(
n∑
j=1
qj − 1) (5.42)
which gives rise to the following family of partial derivative equations,
1 ≤ j ≤ n:
• When n is odd
∂Λ
∂q1
= log n+
λ1
ln 2
(ln q1 + 1)− λ2 = 0 (5.43)
∂Λ
∂q2
= log 2(n− 1) + λ1
ln 2
(ln q2 + 1)− λ2 = 0 (5.44)
... (5.45)
∂Λ
∂qn−1
2
= log
n− 1
2
n+ 3
2
+
λ1
ln 2
(ln qn−1
2
+ 1)− λ2 = 0 (5.46)
∂Λ
∂qn+1
2
= log
n+ 1
2
n+ 1
2
+
λ1
ln 2
(ln qn+1
2
+ 1)− λ2 = 0 (5.47)
... (5.48)
∂Λ
∂qn
= log n+
λ1
ln 2
(ln qn + 1)− λ2 = 0 (5.49)
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• When n is even
∂Λ
∂q1
= log n+
λ1
ln 2
(ln q1 + 1)− λ2 = 0 (5.50)
∂Λ
∂q2
= log 2(n− 1) + λ1
ln 2
(ln q2 + 1)− λ2 = 0 (5.51)
... (5.52)
∂Λ
∂qn
2
= log
n
2
n
2
+
λ1
ln 2
(ln qn
2
+ 1)− λ2 = 0 (5.53)
∂Λ
∂qn+2
2
= log
n+ 2
2
n+ 1
2
+
λ1
ln 2
(ln qn+1
2
+ 1)− λ2 = 0 (5.54)
... (5.55)
∂Λ
∂qn
= log n+
λ1
ln 2
(ln qn + 1)− λ2 = 0 (5.56)
In both cases we can derive :
qi =
(i(n+ 1− i))α
Z(α)
(5.57)
where Z(α) =
∑n
j=1 (j(n+ 1− j))α.
Therefore, it ends up searching for a suitable α, the same as the two high
variable case.
The derivation of more high variables is more or less the same as above,
and hence the result.
5.5 Generalization of Simple Problem
The further generalization of the problem is to generalize the linear con-
straints between program variables Xi as Xi−1 ≤ aiXi + bi (ai, bi ∈ R, i ∈
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N ). The linear inequality constraint(s) between them can be derived using
abstract interpretation, more precisely integer polyhedron. If we consider all
the possible tuple of values of X1, X2, . . . , Xm as a set, we can divide it into
a set of subsets according to the values of Xi. Then recall the definition of
partition in Chapter 2, this is just a partition on the set according to the
values of Xi. Let’s assume that the sizes of each part of the partition are
n1, n2, . . . , nk respectively.
In other words, suppose X and Y are two random variables. Let pi,j =
P (X = i, Y = j) and qi = P (Y = i), the problem is: suppose H(Y ) = a,
what is the maximum possible value for H(X, Y ) = H(~p)?
More formally,
Definition 5.5.1. Let A be a finite set and let P be a set of distributions on
A. We write Hmax(P) to mean the maximum entropy of all distributions in
the set: Hmax(P) = supP∈P H(P ).
Theorem 5.5.2. Let A = {1, . . . , n} and let {Qj}j∈J be a partition of A.
Given a distribution p = {p1, . . . , pn} on A, let q[p] be the distribution induced
on J by the partition: q[p]j =
∑
i∈Qj
pi; call this the marginal distribution for
p. Given 0 ≤ a ≤ log |J |, let Pa be the set of all distributions whose marginal
distribution has a as its entropy: Pa = {p|H(q[p]) = a}. Let k be the size of
the largest part of the partition (k = maxj∈J |Qj|) and let m be the number
of parts having size k (hence 1 ≤ m ≤ |J |). Then there are two cases:
1. if a ≤ logm then Hmax(Pa) = a+ log k
2. if a > logm then there exists a unique α ∈ [0;∞) such that H(q(α)) =
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a, where
q(α)j =
|Qj|α
Z(α)
with Z(α) =
∑
j∈J |Qj|α; in this case
Hmax(Pa) = a+
∑
j∈J
q(α)j log |Qj|
In this general case, we need to consider the range of the value of marginal
entropy constraint, which didn’t come up in the last two sections. This is
simply because in the special case of three-value and its generalized n-value
situation above, there is only one part having the largest size (actually each
part in the partition has different size), therefore m = 1 → logm = 0, as
marginal entropy cannot be less than zero, we do not need to consider the
range of its values.
We can observe from the special cases that the larger the size of the part
is, the greater the contribution it makes to the joint entropy. Thus if there
is any part(s) having zero probability, that should be of the smallest size(s).
However, in the current more general case, there is possibility that there
are several parts having the same largest size of the partition. Suppose
the number of such parts is m, then if marginal entropy of the probability
distribution of such partition is less than or equal to logm, which is the break
point when all the largest size parts have equal probability while all the other
smaller parts having zero probability (in this case the marginal entropy is
exactly logm). If the marginal entropy is less than logm, this means that
there are even some largest size part(s) (not all) have zero probability.
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Or from a purely mathematical point of view, when λ1 is zero, there is no
α such that α = − 1
λ1
. However, actually under such circumstance, α → ∞
makes the largest size part having non-zero probability; if there are m such
parts then they all have the same probability of 1
m
. In terms of marginal
entropy, it is exactly the breaking point of logm.
Thus we need to treat this case separately. Luckily in this case, the proof
when a ≤ logm is quite simple, and the partition version of the joint entropy
(refer to Section 5.3) is all that is needed:
Proof.
Hmax(Pa) = a+
∑
j∈J q(α)j log |Qj|
≤ a+∑j∈J q(α)j log k
= a+ log k
This is actually an upper bound for any partition although it can be
viewed as a special case of our conclusion.
The whole proof procedure for the second situation is more or less the
same as that for the special cases in the last two sections:
Suppose that a joint distribution satisfies H(~q) = a and maximizes H(~p).
The original Lagrangian is as follows:
Λ = −
∑
i,j
pi,j log pi,j−λ1(−
∑
j
q(α)j log q(α)j−a)−λ2(
∑
i,j
pi,j−1) (5.58)
Partial derivative of pi,j respectively gives the following family of equa-
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tions:
1
ln 2
+ log pi,j + λ1(
1
ln 2
+ log q(α)j)− λ2 = 0 (5.59)
Therefore, for ∀i, i′ such that pi,j, pi′,j belong to the same part of the
partition, pi,j = pi′,j. Using the partition version of entropy we can rewrite
our objective function as H(Y ) +∑j q(α)j log |Qj| = a +∑j q(α)j log |Qj|.
Now applying the lagrange multiplier technique to this deduced function:
Λ = a+
∑
j
q(α)j log |Qj| − λ1(−
∑
j
q(α)j log q(α)j − a)− λ2(
∑
j
q(α)j − 1)
(5.60)
Partial derivative of each q(α)j gives rise to the following set of equations:
log |Qj|+ λ1( 1
ln 2
+ log q(α)j)− λ2 = 0 (5.61)
subtracting equations can result in:
log
|Qj|α
|Qj−1|α = log
q(α)i
q(α)i−1
(5.62)
where α = − 1
λ1
(λ1 6= 0). Hence
q(α)j =
|Qj|α
Z(α)
(5.63)
with Z(α) =
∑k
j=1 |Qj|α.
In this case, the proof for the property of monotonically decreasing of
marginal entropy with positive α, is more or less the same as that in the
last section. Thus, a binary search also works for finding suitable α for
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maximum joint entropy in this general case. We now give the formal proof for
the property of monotonically decreasing of marginal entropy in this general
case:
Proposition 5.5.3. Suppose 0 < α, then (
∑m
i=1 n
α
i lnni)
2 ≤∑mi=1 nαi (lnni)2∑mi=1 nαi
where ni is the size of the ith part of the partition.
We use mathematical induction to prove this proposition the same as
above, but first we prove the proposition that our proof will relies on:
Proof. When m = 2:
(
2∑
i=1
nαi lnni)
2 = n2α1 (lnn1)
2 + 2nα1n
α
2 lnn1 lnn2 + n
2α
2 (lnn2)
2
∑2
i=1 n
α
i (lnni)
2
∑2
i=1 n
α
i = (n
α
1 (lnn1)
2 + nα2 (lnn2)
2) (nα1 + n
α
2 )
= n2α1 (lnn1)
2 + nα1n
α
2 (lnn2)
2 + nα1n
α
2 (lnn1)
2 + n2α2 (lnn2)
2
As
nα1n
α
2 (lnn2)
2 + nα1n
α
2 (lnn1)
2 − 2nα1nα2 lnn1 lnn2 = nα1nα2 (lnn1 − lnn2)2 ≥ 0
(with equality only when n1 = n2), thus
(
2∑
i=1
nαi lnni)
2 ≤
2∑
i=1
nαi (lnni)
2
2∑
i=1
nαi
holds.
As a result, the proposition holds when m = 2.
120
Now suppose it also holds when m = k, that is
(
k∑
i=1
nαi lnni)
2 ≤
k∑
i=1
nαi (lnni)
2
k∑
i=1
nαi
When m = k + 1:
(
∑k+1
i=1 n
α
i lnni)
2 =
(∑k
i=1 n
α
i lnni + n
α
k+1 lnnk+1
)2
=
(∑k
i=1 n
α
i lnni
)2
+ 2nαk+1 lnnk+1
∑k
i=1 n
α
i lnni
+n2αk+1(lnnk+1)
2
∑k+1
i=1 n
α
i (lnni)
2
∑k+1
i=1 n
α
i =
∑k+1
i=1 n
α
i (lnni)
2
(∑k
i=1 n
α
i + n
α
k+1
)
=
∑k+1
i=1 n
α
i (lnni)
2
∑k
i=1 n
α
i + n
α
k+1
∑k+1
i=1 n
α
i (lnni)
2
=
∑k
i=1 n
α
i (lnni)
2
∑k
i=1 n
α
i + n
α
k+1(lnnk+1)
2
∑k
i=1 n
α
i
+nαk+1
∑k+1
i=1 n
α
i (lnni)
2
Since (
∑k
i=1 n
α
i lnni)
2 ≤∑ki=1 nαi (lnni)2∑ki=1 nαi :
(
∑k+1
i=1 n
α
i lnni)
2 ≤ ∑ki=1 nαi (lnni)2∑ki=1 nαi + 2nαk+1 lnnk+1∑ki=1 nαi lnni
+n2αk+1(lnnk+1)
2
Therefore, we only need to prove that:
2nαk+1 lnnk+1
∑k
i=1 n
α
i lnni + n
2α
k+1(lnnk+1)
2
≤ nαk+1(lnnk+1)2
∑k
i=1 n
α
i + n
α
k+1
∑k+1
i=1 n
α
i (lnni)
2
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2nαk+1 lnnk+1
∑k
i=1 n
α
i lnni + n
2α
k+1(lnnk+1)
2
= nαk+1
(
2 lnnk+1
∑k
i=1 n
α
i lnni + n
α
k+1(lnnk+1)
2
)
nαk+1(lnnk+1)
2
∑k
i=1 n
α
i + n
α
k+1
∑k+1
i=1 n
α
i (lnni)
2
= nαk+1
(∑k
i=1 n
α
i (lnnk+1)
2 +
∑k+1
i=1 n
α
i (lnni)
2
)
= nαk+1
(∑k
i=1 n
α
i (lnnk+1)
2 +
∑k
i=1 n
α
i (lnni)
2 + nαk+1(lnnk+1)
2
)
Since
∑k
i=1 n
α
i (lnnk+1)
2 +
∑k
i=1 n
α
i (lnni)
2 − 2 lnnk+1
∑k
i=1 n
α
i lnni
=
∑k
i=1 n
α
i (lnnk+1 − lnni)2
≥ 0
Thus
2nαk+1 lnnk+1
∑k
i=1 n
α
i lnni + n
2α
k+1(lnnk+1)
2
≤ nαk+1(lnnk+1)2
∑k
i=1 n
α
i + n
α
k+1
∑k+1
i=1 n
α
i (lnni)
2
holds.
Therefore, the conclusion holds when m = k + 1, which is:
(
k+1∑
i=1
nαi lnni)
2 ≤
k+1∑
i=1
nαi (lnni)
2
k+1∑
i=1
nαi
As a result, the proposition holds for all n. Equality only when n1 =
. . . = nm.
Now let’s prove the property of monotonically decreasing:
Proposition 5.5.4. Suppose Y is an integer variable and the probability
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P (Y = i) of Y is { nαi
Z(α)
}, if 0 ≤ α < α′, then H(Y (α′)) ≤ H(Y (α)) where ni
is the size of the ith part of the partition and Z(α) =
∑
i n
α
i .
Proposition 5.4.1 is proved by showing that the first derivative of marginal
entropy is less than or equal to zero:
Proof.
H(Y (α)) = −∑i nαiZ(α) log nαiZ(α)
= −∑i nαiZ(α)(log nαi − logZ(α))
= −∑i nαiZ(α) log nαi +∑i nαiZ(α) logZ(α)
= logZ(α)−∑i αnαi logniZ(α)
Its first derivative of α is:
H(Y (α))′ = Z(α)′
Z(α) ln 2
−
P
i(n
α
i +αn
α
i lnni)Z(α) logni−αn
α
i Z(α)
′ logni
(Z(α))2
= Z(α)
′
Z(α) ln 2
−
P
i n
α
i logniZ(α)+
P
i αn
α
i lnni logniZ(α)−
P
i αn
α
i logniZ(α)
′
(Z(α))2
= Z(α)
′
Z(α) ln 2
−
P
i n
α
i lnniZ(α)+
P
i αn
α
i (lnni)
2Z(α)−
P
i αn
α
i lnniZ(α)
′
(Z(α))2 ln 2
=
Z(α)′Z(α)−Z(α)′Z(α)+α((Z(α)′)2−
P
i n
α
i (lnni)
2Z(α))
(Z(α))2 ln 2
=
α((
P
i n
α
i lnni)
2−
P
i n
α
i (lnni)
2
P
i n
α
i )
(Z(α))2 ln 2
≤ 0(as α > 0)
which is just Proposition 5.5.3, hence the proof completes. Equality only
holds when all the parts of the partition are of the same size.
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5.6 Case Study and Comparison with CHM’s
Framework
Besides the simple example of X := Y ; Z := X + Y ; which already demon-
strates that our algorithm is capable of deducing more precise upper bounds
of information leakage, in this section we give detailed analyses of some other
programs and compare them with CHM’s framework.
5.6.1 Program with One Linear Constraint
Consider the program in Section 5.3 again with X and Y both high program
variables where each has a positive integer domain of [1, . . . , n] and Z is the
low observable variable, that is:
Example 5.6.1.
if X ≤ Y then
Z := X + Y ;
else
Z := 0;
Suppose H(Y ) = a, what is the possible maximum leakage that can be
leaked by Z := X + Y ?
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CHM’s Analysis
Using CHM’s framework, only the [If](2) reference rule can apply, which
states that
If(2)
Γ ⊢ B : [0, 0] ⊢ Γ{Ci}x : [ai, bi]
⊢ Γ{if B C1 C2}x : [min(a1, a2),max(b1, b2)]
As neither the guard X ≤ Y nor the else branch Z := 0 leaks any informa-
tion, all the information that can be leaked by this if statement is via its
then branch, therefore, the maximum information that can be leaked by the
above example is maximum H(Z) in the then branch.
Now by using the [Plus] inference rule:
Plus
Γ ⊢ Ei : [,bi]
Γ ⊢ (E1 + E2) : [0, b1 + b2]
Given Hmax(Y ) = a, as there is no other constraint on the maximum entropy
of X, its maximum of log n can be assumed, thus Hmax(X + Y ) = a+ log n
which universally holds.
Finally by applying the assignment inference rule [Ass]:
Ass
Γ ⊢ E : [a, b]
⊢ Γ{x := E}x : [a, b]
we can infer that the maximum leakage into Z is the same asHmax(X+Y )
which is a+ log n.
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Our Analysis
If we build our analysis into the framework of CHM’s, we can derive a much
more precise upper bound, and here is how to do it:
First the abstract interpretation is expected to give the following linear
constraints (although this example is so simple that even without abstract
interpretation we can still derive the right linear constraints):
Suppose there isn’t any constraint of X and Y before the if statement,
in the then branch, it is X ≤ Y, Z = X + Y while in the else branch it is
X ≥ Y + 1, Z = 0.
Now just as above, using CHM’s inference rule [If](2), the maximum
information that can be leaked by the above example is 1 +Hmax(Z), thus
we only need to find out maximum H(Z) in the then branch. Using our
algorithm which is explained in detail in Section 5.1-5.5 of this chapter, if
we divide the set of (X, Y ) according to the values that Y takes, then it is a
partition of sizes {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Recall that the marginal entropy constraint of Y can be achieved by
constructing a marginal probability distribution P (Y = i) = qi which is only
based on the sizes of the parts and a parameter α:
qi =
iα
Z(α)
where Z(α) =
∑
i i
α and using the partition version of entropy (refer to
Section 5.3), the maximum entropy that Z can have is:
H(Z) = H(Y ) + qi log i
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H(Y ) α P (Y ) Hmax(Z) H(Y ) + log n
0.2 15.5386 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0003, 0.0302, 0.9694} 2.5119 2.5219
0.4 11.4449 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0027, 0.0720, 0.9253} 2.6968 2.7219
0.6 8.9541 {0.0000, 0.0002, 0.0090, 0.1183, 0.8725} 2.8769 2.9219
0.8 7.1533 {0.0000, 0.0012, 0.0210, 0.1648, 0.8130} 3.0518 3.1219
1 5.7495 {0.0001, 0.0039, 0.0397, 0.2076, 0.7488} 3.2206 3.3219
1.2 4.6085 {0.0004, 0.0100, 0.0647, 0.2436, 0.6813} 3.3817 3.5219
1.4 3.6568 {0.0017, 0.0215, 0.0945, 0.2705, 0.6118} 3.5329 3.7219
1.6 2.8472 {0.0055, 0.0399, 0.1264, 0.2868, 0.5414} 3.6709 3.9219
1.8 2.1411 {0.0150, 0.0661, 0.1574, 0.2915, 0.4700} 3.7899 4.1219
2 1.4931 {0.0358, 0.1006, 0.1845, 0.2835, 0.3956} 3.8785 4.3219
2.1493 1 {0.0667, 0.1334, 0.2000, 0.2666, 0.3333} 3.9068 4.4712
2.3219 0 {0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2} 3.7033 4.6439
Table 5.1: Maximum information leakage for Example 5.7.1 with n = 5
Thus, instead of adding the upper bounds of entropies of X and Y to-
gether, the maximum information that can be leaked to Z is the maximum
joint entropy of X and Y which equals a +
∑n
i=1
iα
Z(α)
log i and it is strictly
< a+ log n.
Here we don’t have to explicitly using separate [Plus] and [Ass] rules,
as our algorithm unifies the assignment whose right hand side can involve
addition, subtraction, multiplication and division.
Concrete Results
Now we give some concrete numerical results for different marginal entropy
H(Y ) for given n, Table 5.1 is when n = 5, note in this case the sizes of parts
are {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}; Table 5.2 are for n = 10.
In this table, the column of H(Y ) is the value of the marginal entropy
constraint, we choose to start from 0.2 and increase to 2 on an interval of
0.2 (please note that there is nothing special to choose these values, other
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values can also be chosen as well). The last two values (2.1493 and 2.3219)
are chosen on purpose, as one (2.1493) gives the largest value ofHmax(Z) and
the other corresponding to the maximum marginal entropy H(Y ), however,
as shown in the table, it won’t give us the maximum information leakage of
Z.
The column α is the value of α that is computed using our algorithm,
under the corresponding marginal entropy constraint value of H(Y ) and the
linear constraint of X ≤ Y in this example, for example, if H(Y ) = 0.2,
then according to our analysis, the probability distribution which satisfies
this marginal entropy value and the constraint that X ≤ Y is: qi = iαZ(α) ,
as here n = 5 which means Y ∈ [1, . . . , 5], the problem we need to solve is
0.2 =
∑5
i=1−qi log qi, we use binary search to solve α, starting from range
[0, 20] (with precision 10−4), we stop by when |H(Y )− 0.2| ≤ 10−3.
Once the α value is known, the column of P (Y ) (the probability of Y
which gives the maximum entropy) is just the calculation of i
α
Z(α)
.
The column Hmax(Z) is the value of H(Y ) +
∑
i qi log i where qi are the
corresponding value under P (Y ) and i ∈ [1, . . . , 5].
The column H(Y ) + log n = H(Y ) + log 5 thus it varies with H(Y ).
The explanation for Table 5.2 is exactly the same as for 5.1 except that
here n = 10 not 5.
5.6.2 Program with Multiple Linear Constraints
Now let’s consider programs with more complex linear constraints (Section
3.3):
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H(Y ) α P (Y ) Hmax(Z) H(Y ) + log n
0.1 41.2661 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000,
0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0001, 0.0128, 0.9871}
3.4200 3.4219
0.4 24.6453 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000,
0.0000, 0.0001, 0.0038, 0.0691, 0.9270}
3.7101 3.7219
0.7 17.6469 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000,
0.0001, 0.0016, 0.0166, 0.1323, 0.8494}
3.9956 4.0219
1 13.1881 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0001,
0.0009, 0.0069, 0.0402, 0.1899, 0.7620}
4.2758 4.3219
1.3 9.9873 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0001, 0.0007,
0.0041, 0.0190, 0.0722, 0.2340, 0.6701}
4.5496 4.6219
1.6 7.5598 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0001, 0.0006, 0.0031,
0.0122, 0.0390, 0.1069, 0.2605, 0.5777}
4.8150 4.9219
1.9 5.6617 {0.0000, 0.0001, 0.0005, 0.0027, 0.0096,
0.0271, 0.0648, 0.1380, 0.2689, 0.4882}
5.0690 5.2219
2.2 2.9228 {0.0000, 0.0005, 0.0027, 0.0090, 0.0228,
0.0485, 0.0919, 0.1600, 0.2608, 0.4037}
5.3070 5.5219
2.5 2.1411 {0.0004, 0.0029, 0.0096, 0.0223, 0.0429,
0.0731, 0.1147, 0.1695, 0.2391, 0.3254}
5.5208 5.8219
2.8 1.9092 {0.0031, 0.0117, 0.0254, 0.0440, 0.0673,
0.0954, 0.1280, 0.1652, 0.2069, 0.2530}
5.6940 6.1219
3.1036 1 {0.0182, 0.0364, 0.0545, 0.0727, 0.0909,
0.1091, 0.1273, 0.1455, 0.1636, 0.1818}
5.7813 6.4255
3.3219 0 {0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1,
0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1}
5.5010 6.6438
Table 5.2: Maximum information leakage for Example 5.7.1 with n = 10
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Example 5.6.2.
if X + Y ≥ 5 && X − Y ≥ −1then
Z := 0;
else
X := 3; Y := 4;
fi;
Y := X + Y/2 + 1;
Z := f(X, Y );
Where X and Y are both high variables with positive integer domains
[1, . . . , n] and [1, . . . , 2n] respectively (the reasoning is exactly the same if
both of them are k-bit two’s complement variables, which means these vari-
ables are k bits binary and they represent two’s complement numbers, e.g.
8-bit two’s complement 11111111 = −110, not 25510), for simplicity and eas-
ier to understand, we use positive integer domains in the following analysis,
Z is a low program variable and f(X, Y ) is some linear function of X and
Y , i.e. addition, subtraction and etc.
CHM’s Analysis
Their analysis is pretty much the same as the reasoning for Example 5.6.1
and would end up with a maximum amount of a + log 2n of information
leaking into Z given that H(X) = a.
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Our Analysis
First the abstract interpretation is expected to derive the following linear
constraints at each program point:
Suppose there isn’t any other constraint of X and Y , then after the if
statement it is {X + Y ≥ 5, X − Y ≥ −1, Y ≥ 0} (the merge of {X + Y ≥
5, X−Y ≥ −1} and X := 3; Y := 4 is {X+Y ≥ 5, X−Y ≥ −1}), after the
assignment it is {2Y−2X ≥ 2, 2Y−X ≥ 7, −2Y +3X ≥ −3, Z = f(X, Y )}.
Please refer to Figure 5.5 for the polyhedron corresponding to the con-
straints before and after assignment, refer to section 3.2.4 for detail.
As above, if we divide the set of (X, Y ) according to the values that X
can take, we can have a partition of sizes {2, 2, 3, 3, . . . , n
2
, n
2
} when n is even;
{2, 2, 3, 3, . . . , n−1
2
, n−1
2
, n+1
2
} when n is odd.
Recall Theorem 5.5.2, let k be the size of the largest part of the parti-
tion and m be the number of parts having size k, then if a ≤ logm then
Hmax(Pa) = a + log k, otherwise we can use our method of searching for
suitable α to obtain the maximal leakage.
Hence there are two cases to consider when n is even:
• if H(X) = a < log 2 = 1, then we can have that Hmax(Z) = a+log 2 =
a+ 1;
• otherwise, the maximum leakage into Z isHmax(X, Y ) = a+
∑n
i qi log |Qi|
where qi is the probability P (X = i) which can be derived based on
the sizes of parts of the partition as qi = |Qi|α/Z(α) and Z(α) =
2(2α + 3α + . . . + (n
2
)α). As the maximum |Qi |= n2 in this case, hence
Hmax(X, Y ) = a+
∑n
i qi log |Qi| < a+ log n2 hence strictly < a+ log n.
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Figure 5.5: Polyhedron for Example 5.7.2 with horizontal axis being X and
vertical axis being Y
When n is odd, it is the same as the second situation above.
Concrete Result
Here are some concrete numerical results for different marginal entropyH(Y )
for given n,
Table 5.3 is when n = 5, note in this case the sizes of parts are {2, 2, 3};
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the other table is for n = 10, in this case, there are two parts having the
same largest size, hence different ranges of marginal entropy of X will have
different type of maximum leakage as shown in Table 5.4:
In more detail, in Table 5.3, the column of H(X) is the value of the
marginal entropy constraint, we choose to start from 0.2 and increase to 1.4
on an interval of 0.2 (please note that there is nothing special to choose these
values, other values can also be chosen as well). The last two values (1.5567
and 1.5850) are chosen on purpose, as one (1.5567) gives the largest value
of Hmax(Z) and the other (1.5850) corresponding to the maximum marginal
entropy H(X), however, as shown in the table, it won’t give us the maximum
information leakage of Z.
The column α is the value of α that is computed using our algorithm,
under the corresponding marginal entropy constraint value of H(X) and
the linear constraint in this example, for example, if H(X) = 0.2, then
according to our analysis, the probability distribution which satisfies this
marginal entropy value and the constraint is: qi =
|Qi|
α
Z(α)
, as here n = 5
which means we have a partition of {2, 2, 3}, the problem we need to solve is
0.2 = −2 2α
Z(α)
log 2
α
Z(α)
− 3α
Z(α)
log 3
α
Z(α)
where Z(α) = 22α + 3α, we use binary
search to solve α, starting from range [0, 20] (with precision 10−4), we stop
by when |H(Y )− 0.2| ≤ 10−3.
Once the α value is known, the column of P (Y ) (the probability of X
which gives the maximum entropy) is just the calculation of i
α
Z(α)
.
The column Hmax(Z) is the value of H(X) +
∑
i qi log |Qi| where qi are
the corresponding value under P (X).
The column H(X) + log n = H(X) + log 5 thus it varies with H(X).
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H(X) α P (X) Hmax(Z) H(X) + log n
0.2 10.6429 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0130, 0.0130, 0.9740} 1.7697 2.5219
0.4 8.3858 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0313, 0.0313, 0.9374} 1.9484 2.7219
0.6 6.9279 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0538, 0.0538, 0.8924} 2.1220 2.9219
0.8 5.7680 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0809, 0.0809, 0.8382} 2.2904 3.1219
1 4.7298 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.1136, 0.1136, 0.7728} 2.4521 3.3219
1.2 3.6993 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.1543, 0.1543, 0.6914} 2.6045 3.5219
1.4 2.5150 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.2095, 0.2095, 0.5810} 2.7398 3.7219
1.5567 1 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.2858, 0.2858, 0.4284} 2.8073 3.8786
1.5850 0 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.3333, 0.3333, 0.3334} 2.7800 3.9069
Table 5.3: Maximum information leakage for Example 5.7.2 with n = 5
When H(X) ≤ 1 as we discussed earlier, Hmax(Z) = H(X) + log 2, there
is no need to calculate either α or P (X), so we use − to skip the calculation.
Note that in this example, even if n = 10, X can only take 8 values,
and this can be captured by the abstract interpretation, however, traditional
quantitative information flow analysis (e.g. CHM’s framework) has no way
to know it hence cannot utilize it.
5.6.3 Program with While loop
Now let’s look at an example of while loop and how our analysis deals with
it:
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H(X) α P (X) Hmax(Z) H(X) + log n
0.1 - - 1.1 2.4219
0.4 - - 1.4 2.7219
0.7 - - 1.7 3.0219
1 - - 2 3.3219
1.3 13.1693 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.00000.0006,
0.0006, 0.0251, 0.0251, 0.4743, 0.4743}
3.6049 4.6219
1.6 8.9540 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0001, 0.0001, 0.0045,
0.0045, 0.0592, 0.0592, 0.4362, 0.4362}
3.8769 4.9219
1.9 6.4094 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0011, 0.0011, 0.0148,
0.0148, 0.0935, 0.0935, 0.3906, 0.3906}
4.1370 5.2219
2.2 4.5834 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0051, 0.0051, 0.0327,
0.0327, 0.1222, 0.1222, 0.3400, 0.3400}
4.3815 5.5219
2.5 3.1167 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0163, 0.0163, 0.0578,
0.0578, 0.1417, 0.1417, 0.2841, 0.2841}
4.6023 5.8219
2.8 1.7208 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0449, 0.0449, 0.0901,
0.0901, 0.1479, 0.1479, 0.2171, 0.2171}
4.7752 6.1219
2.9242 1 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0714, 0.0714, 0.1071,
0.10710.1429, 0.1429, 0.1786, 0.1786}
4.8074 6.4255
3 0 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.1250, 0.1250, 0.1250,
0.1250, 0.1250, 0.1250, 0.1250, 0.1250}
4.7267 6.6438
Table 5.4: Maximum information leakage for Example 5.7.2 with n = 10
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Example 5.6.3.
Z := 0;
while X ≤ Y
Z := 0;
Z := X + Y ;
X := X + 1;
end while
with X and Y each can take integer values in the range of [1, . . . , n], and
the marginal constraint H(Y ) = a. Z is initialized to 0 and can be only
observed as the output, it cannot be observed during the program.
This example is partially equivalent to the simple program of X := Y +
1; Z =: X + Y − 1 if the body of the while loop is executed at least once
and the program terminates.
CHM’s framework
CHM’s analysis towards while loop first conducts a dependence analysis
to establish all the sources of information that flows into the loop. In this
example, it is quite clear that Z depends on X and Y , X depends on Y ,
namely [Z 7→ {X, Y }], [X 7→ {Y }]]. Thus, there are two information sources
X and Y , since the only place where information will be leaked is at Z :=
X + Y . According to the general data processing rule, it is easy to derive
that the maximum amount of information that can be leaked is a+ log n.
Our analysis
There are two cases to consider:
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• X ≥ Y + 1 before the loop:
In this case, there is no information leakage as the while loop will not
be executed.
• X ≤ Y before the loop:
In this case, the abstract interpretation is expected to give X ≤ Y ,
using our analysis, we can have Hmax(Z) = a + qi log i, where P (Y =
i) = qi =
iα
Z(α)
the same as Example 5.6.1. This result is the best we
can get based on current abstract interpretation analysis.
Thus in both situations, the maximum leakage does not exceed Hmax(Z).
However, the actual upper bound of information into Z should be a as
when while loops terminates, X is always equal to Y , hence actually Z :=
2Y . If abstract interpretation can provide more precise linear constraint such
as it can capture that fact that when the above loop terminates, X = Y + 1
is always held, then our analysis will, in turn, give more precise result as
Hmax(Z) = a.
Concrete Result
The concrete results are shown in Table 5.5 for n = 5 and as Table 5.6 for n =
10, note that the most precise upper bound should be Hmax(Z) = H(Y ) = a.
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H(Y ) α P (Y ) Hmax(Z) H(Y ) + log n
0.2 15.5386 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0003, 0.0302, 0.9694} 2.5119 2.5219
0.4 11.4449 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0027, 0.0720, 0.9253} 2.6968 2.7219
0.6 8.9541 {0.0000, 0.0002, 0.0090, 0.1183, 0.8725} 2.8769 2.9219
0.8 7.1533 {0.0000, 0.0012, 0.0210, 0.1648, 0.8130} 3.0518 3.1219
1 5.7495 {0.0001, 0.0039, 0.0397, 0.2076, 0.7488} 3.2206 3.3219
1.2 4.6085 {0.0004, 0.0100, 0.0647, 0.2436, 0.6813} 3.3817 3.5219
1.4 3.6568 {0.0017, 0.0215, 0.0945, 0.2705, 0.6118} 3.5329 3.7219
1.6 2.8472 {0.0055, 0.0399, 0.1264, 0.2868, 0.5414} 3.6709 3.9219
1.8 2.1411 {0.0150, 0.0661, 0.1574, 0.2915, 0.4700} 3.7899 4.1219
2 1.4931 {0.0358, 0.1006, 0.1845, 0.2835, 0.3956} 3.8785 4.3219
2.1493 1 {0.0667, 0.1334, 0.2000, 0.2666, 0.3333} 3.9068 4.4712
2.3219 0 {0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2} 3.7033 4.6439
Table 5.5: Maximum information leakage for Example 5.7.3 with n = 5
138
H(Y ) α P (Y ) Hmax(Z) H(Y ) + log n
0.1 41.2661 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000,
0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0001, 0.0128, 0.9871}
3.4200 3.4219
0.4 24.6453 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000,
0.0000, 0.0001, 0.0038, 0.0691, 0.9270}
3.7101 3.7219
0.7 17.6469 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000,
0.0001, 0.0016, 0.0166, 0.1323, 0.8494}
3.9956 4.0219
1 13.1881 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0001,
0.0009, 0.0069, 0.0402, 0.1899, 0.7620}
4.2758 4.3219
1.3 9.9873 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0001, 0.0007,
0.0041, 0.0190, 0.0722, 0.2340, 0.6701}
4.5496 4.6219
1.6 7.5598 {0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0001, 0.0006, 0.0031,
0.0122, 0.0390, 0.1069, 0.2605, 0.5777}
4.8150 4.9219
1.9 5.6617 {0.0000, 0.0001, 0.0005, 0.0027, 0.0096,
0.0271, 0.0648, 0.1380, 0.2689, 0.4882}
5.0690 5.2219
2.2 2.9228 {0.0000, 0.0005, 0.0027, 0.0090, 0.0228,
0.0485, 0.0919, 0.1600, 0.2608, 0.4037}
5.3070 5.5219
2.5 2.1411 {0.0004, 0.0029, 0.0096, 0.0223, 0.0429,
0.0731, 0.1147, 0.1695, 0.2391, 0.3254}
5.5208 5.8219
2.8 1.9092 {0.0031, 0.0117, 0.0254, 0.0440, 0.0673,
0.0954, 0.1280, 0.1652, 0.2069, 0.2530}
5.6940 6.1219
3.1036 1 {0.0182, 0.0364, 0.0545, 0.0727, 0.0909,
0.1091, 0.1273, 0.1455, 0.1636, 0.1818}
5.7813 6.4255
3.3219 0 {0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1,
0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1}
5.5010 6.6438
Table 5.6: Maximum information leakage for Example 5.7.3 with n = 10
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Chapter 6
Two Constraints Joint Entropy
Maximization and
Generalization
In the last chapter, the single constraint joint entropy maximization problem
is discussed in details, however the more common situation is with multiple
constraints, e.g. H(X) = a and H(Y ) = b. Although it looks like that there
is just only one more marginal constraint compared with the single constraint
problem, the complexity of the two constraints problem is more than double
of that of the single one. This is mainly because the two constraint problem
is three dimensional which is difficult to analyze in the first place, and the
second is the complexity of the entropy function itself. This chapter shows
some investigation into the problem.
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6.1 Simple Problem
Let’s still consider the example of the simple program 5.6.1 from the last
chapter, from which the relationship between program variables X and Y is
the same as X ≤ Y,X ≥ 0. To make the induction as simple as possible in
this problem, let’s assume that X and Y are both binary variables. Together
with two marginal entropy constraintsH(X) = a andH(Y ) = b, the question
is the same: what is the maximal value for the joint entropy H(X, Y ) of X
and Y ?
Let pi,j = P (X = i, Y = j) and let ri = P (X = i), qj = P (Y = j). Note
that, since X ≤ Y , we may restrict attention to pi,j such that i ≤ j.
Mathematically, the objective function we want to maximize is:
H(X, Y )X≤Y, X,Y ∈[0, 1] = −
∑
i, j∈[0, 1], i≤j
pi,j log pi,j (6.1)
Subject to the following constraints:
H(~r)− a = 0 (6.2)
H(~q)− b = 0 (6.3)∑
i≤j, i,j∈[0,1]
pi,j − 1 = 0 (6.4)
Now define the Lagrangian Λ as
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Λ = −pi,j log pi,j − λ1(H(X)− a)− λ2(H(Y )− b)− λ3(
∑
i,j
pi,j − 1) (6.5)
which gives rise to the following family of partial derivative equations,
i ≤ j, i, j ∈ [0, 1]:
∂Λ
∂p0,0
= −(log p0,0 + 1
ln 2
) + λ1(log r0 +
1
ln 2
) + λ2(log q0 +
1
ln 2
)− λ3 = 0 (6.6)
∂Λ
∂p0,1
= −(log p0,1 + 1
ln 2
) + λ1(log r0 +
1
ln 2
) + λ2(log q1 +
1
ln 2
)− λ3 = 0 (6.7)
∂Λ
∂p1,1
= −(log p1,1 + 1
ln 2
) + λ1(log r1 +
1
ln 2
) + λ2(log q1 +
1
ln 2
)− λ3 = 0 (6.8)
By subtracting the above equations from each other, we can get the fol-
lowing:
log p0,1 − log p0,0 = λ2(log q1 − log q0) (6.9)
log p1,1 − log p0,1 = λ1(log r1 − log r0) (6.10)
hence
log
p0,1
p0,0
= λ2(log
q1
q0
) (6.11)
log
p1,1
p0,1
= λ1(log
r1
r0
) (6.12)
Let α = λ1 and β = λ2. Then we have:
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p0,0 =
(
q0
q1
)β
p0,1 (6.13)
p1,1 =
(
r1
r0
)α
p0,1 (6.14)
Substitute them into the constraint of
∑
pi,j = 1:
((
q0
q1
)β
+
(
r1
r0
)α
+ 1
)
p0,1 = 1 (6.15)
qβ0 r
α
0 + r
α
1 q
β
1 + r
α
0 q
β
1
qβ1 r
α
0
p0,1 = 1 (6.16)
thus
p0,0 =
rα0 q
β
0
Z(α, β)
(6.17)
p0,1 =
rα0 q
β
1
Z(α, β)
(6.18)
p1,1 =
rα1 q
β
1
Z(α, β)
(6.19)
Where Z(α, β) =
∑
i,j r
α
i q
β
j = r
α
0 q
β
0 + r
α
0 q
β
1 + r
α
1 q
β
1 .
6.1.1 Properties of H(X) and H(Y )
We now show that H(X) is a concave function in terms of α, and the same
of that for H(Y ) in terms of β.
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Proof for H(X)
We first show the concaveness of H(X) in terms of α. The proof is conducted
to show that there is a zero point in the first derivative of H(X), beyond this
point, the first derivative is either larger or less than zero.
Proof. As pi,j =
rαi q
β
j
Z(α,β)
and X ≤ Y ,
r0 =
rα0 (q
β
0 + q
β
1 )
Z(α, β)
, r1 =
rα1 q
β
1
Z(α, β)
Thus,
H(X) = − rα0 (qβ0+qβ1 )
Z(α,β)
log
rα
0
(qβ
0
+qβ
1
)
Z(α,β)
− rα1 qβ1
Z(α,β)
log
rα
1
q
β
1
Z(α,β)
= − rα0 (qβ0+qβ1 )
Z(α,β)
(
log rα0 (q
β
0 + q
β
1 )− logZ(α, β)
)
− rα1 qβ1
Z(α,β)
(
log rα1 q
β
1 − logZ(α, β)
)
= logZ(α, β)− rα0 (qβ0+qβ1 )
Z(α,β)
log rα0 (q
β
0 + q
β
1 )− r
α
1
q
β
1
Z(α,β)
log rα1 q
β
1
= logZ(α, β)− rα0 (qβ0+qβ1 )
Z(α,β)
(
α log r0 + log(q
β
0 + q
β
1 )
)
− rα1 qβ1
Z(α,β)
(
α log r1 + log q
β
1
)
= logZ(α, β)− αrα0 (qβ0+qβ1 )
Z(α,β)
log r0 − r
α
0
(qβ
0
+qβ
1
)
Z(α,β)
log(qβ0 + q
β
1 )
−α rα1 qβ1
Z(α,β)
log r1 − r
α
1
q
β
1
Z(α,β)
log qβ1
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partial derivative of α is:
∂H(X)
∂α
= Z
′(α,β)α
Z(α,β) ln 2 − ((r
α
0+αr
α
0 ln r0)Z(α,β)−αrα0Z ′(α,β)α)(qβ0+qβ1 ) ln r0
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
− (rα0 ln r0Z(α,β)−rα0Z ′(α,β)α)(qβ0+qβ1 ) ln(qβ0+qβ1 )(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
− ((rα1+αrα1 ln r1)Z(α,β)−αrα1Z(α,β)′α)qβ1 ln r1(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
− (rα1 ln r1Z(α,β)−rα1Z ′(α,β)α)qβ1 ln qβ1(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
= Z
′(α,β)α
Z(α,β) ln 2 − (r
α
0+αr
α
0 ln r0)Z(α,β)(q
β
0+q
β
1 ) ln r0
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2 − r
α
0 ln r0Z(α,β)(q
β
0+q
β
1 ) ln(q
β
0+q
β
1 )
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
− (rα1+αrα1 ln r1)Z(α,β)qβ1 ln r1(Z(α,β))2 ln 2 − r
α
1 ln r1Z(α,β)q
β
1 ln q
β
1
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
+αr
α
0 (q
β
0+q
β
1 ) ln r0Z
′(α,β)α
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2 +
rα0 (q
β
0+q
β
1 ) ln(q
β
0+q
β
1 )Z
′(α,β)α
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
+αr
α
1 q
β
1 ln r1Z
′(α,β)α
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2 +
rα1 q
β
1 ln q
β
1Z
′(α,β)α
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
= −(r
α
0 (q
β
0+q
β
1 )(ln r
α
0 (q
β
0+q
β
1 )) ln r0+r
α
1 q
β
1 (ln r
α
1 q
β
1 ) ln r1)(rα0 (q
β
0+q
β
1 )+r
α
1 q
β
1 )
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
+
(rα0 (q
β
0+q
β
1 )(ln r
α
0 (q
β
0+q
β
1 ))+r
α
1 q
β
1 (ln r
α
1 q
β
1 ))((rα0 (q
β
0+q
β
1 )) ln r0+r
α
1 q
β
1 ln r1)
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
= −r
α
0 (q
β
0+q
β
1 )r
β
1 q
β
1 (ln rα1 q
β
1 ln r1+ln r
α
0 (q
β
0+q
β
1 ))
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
+
rα0 (q
β
0+q
β
1 )r
β
1 q
β
1 (ln rα1 q
β
1 ln r0+ln r
α
0 (q
β
0+q
β
1 ) ln r1)
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
=
rα0 (q
β
0+q
β
1 )r
β
1 q
β
1 ln
rα1 q
β
1
rα0 (q
β
0 +q
β
1 )
ln
r0
r1
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
as rα0 (q
β
0 + q
β
1 )r
β
1 q
β
1 > 0, when the partial derivative equals zero, it is
ln
rα1 q
β
1
rα0 (q
β
0 + q
β
1 )
ln
r0
r1
= 0
(
α ln
r1
r0
+ ln
qβ1
qβ0 + q
β
1
)
ln
r0
r1
= 0
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If r0 6= r1, hence , ln r0r1 6= 0:
α =
ln
q
β
0
+qβ
1
q
β
1
ln r1
r0
Please note that r0 > r1 and this can be argued simply as r0 = p(0, 0) +
p(0, 1), r1 = p(1, 1). In order to let joint entropy gets as large as possible,
p(0, 0), p(0, 1), p(1, 1) should go towards uniform as much as possible, which
will definitely make r0 > r1.
Thus when α >
ln
q
β
0
+q
β
1
q
β
1
ln
r1
r0
, the above partial derivative is always < 0 while
when α <
ln
q
β
0
+q
β
1
q
β
1
ln
r1
r0
, the above partial derivative is always > 0.
If r0 = r1, then in this case where X and Y can only take [0, 1], we can
know that r0 = r1 = 0.5, then the problem can be transferred back to the
single constraint problem with marginal constraint of H(Y ).
Proof for H(Y )
We can conduct the partial derivative of β based on the same reasoning:
Proof. As pi,j =
rαi q
β
j
Z(α,β)
and X ≤ Y ,
q0 =
rα0 q
β
0
Z(α, β)
, q1 =
(rα0 + r
α
1 )q
β
1
Z(α, β)
146
Thus,
H(Y ) = rα0 qβ0
Z(α,β)
log
rα
0
q
β
0
Z(α,β)
− (rα0 +rα1 )qβ1
Z(α,β)
log
(rα
0
+rα
1
)qβ
1
Z(α,β)
= − rα0 qβ0
Z(α,β)
(
log rα0 q
β
0 − logZ(α, β)
)
− (rα0 +rα1 )qβ1
Z(α,β)
(
log(rα0 + r
α
1 )q
β
1 − logZ(α, β)
)
= logZ(α, β)− rα0 qβ0
Z(α,β)
log rα0 q
β
0 )− (r
α
0
+rα
1
)qβ
1
Z(α,β)
log(rα0 + r
α
1 )q
β
1
= logZ(α, β)− rα0 qβ0
Z(α,β)
(log rα0 + β log q0)− (r
α
0
+rα
1
)qβ
1
Z(α,β)
(log(rα0 + r
α
1 ) + β log q1)
= logZ(α, β)− rα0 qβ0
Z(α,β)
log rα0 − βr
α
0
q
β
0
Z(α,β)
log q0
− (rα0 +rα1 )qβ1
Z(α,β)
log(rα0 + r
α
1 )− β(r
α
0
+rα
1
)qβ
1
Z(α,β)
log q1
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partial derivative of β is:
∂H(Y )
∂β
=
Z ′(α,β)β
Z(α,β) ln 2 −
((qβ0+βq
β
0 ln q0)Z(α,β)−βqβ0Z ′(α,β)α)rα0 ln q0
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
−(q
β
1 ln q1Z(α,β)−qβ1Z ′(α,β)β)(rα0+rα1 ) ln(rα0+rα1 )
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
−((q
β
1+βq
β
1 ln q1)Z(α,β)−βqβ1Z ′(α,β)β)(rα0+rα1 ) ln q1
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
−(q
β
0 ln q0Z(α,β)−qβ0Z ′(α,β)β)rα0 ln rα0
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
=
Z ′(α,β)β
Z(α,β) ln 2 − (q
β
0+βq
β
0 ln q0)Z(α,β)r
α
0 ln q0
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2 − q
β
1 ln q1Z(α,β)(r
α
0+r
α
1 ) ln(r
α
0+r
α
1 )
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
− (qβ1+βqβ1 ln q1)Z(α,β)(rα0+rα1 ) ln q1(Z(α,β))2 ln 2 − q
β
0 ln q0Z(α,β)r
α
0 ln r
α
0
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
+
βq
β
0 r
α
0 ln q
β
0Z
′(α,β)β
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2 +
q
β
1 (r
α
0+r
α
1 ) ln(r
α
0+r
α
1 )Z
′(α,β)β
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
+
βq
β
1 (r
α
0+r
α
1 ) ln q1Z
′(α,β)β
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2 +
q
β
0 r
α
0 ln r
α
0Z
′(α,β)β
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
= −(r
α
0 q
β
0 ln q0 ln r
α
0 q
β
0+(r
α
0+r
α
1 )q
β
1 ln(r
α
0+r
α
1 )q
β
1 ln q1)(rα0 q
β
0+(r
α
0+r
α
1 )q
β
1 )
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
+
(rα0 q
β
0 ln r
α
0 q
β
0+(r
α
0+r
α
1 )q
β
1 ln(r
α
0+r
α
1 )q
β
1 )((rα0 q
β
0 ln q0+(r
α
0+r
α
1 )q
β
1 ln q1)
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
= −r
α
0 q
β
0 (r
α
0+r
α
1 )q
β
1 (ln rα0 q
β
0 ln q0+ln(r
α
0+r
α
1 )q
β
1 ln q1)
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
+
rα0 q
β
0 (r
α
0+r
α
1 )q
β
1 (ln rα0 q
β
0 ln q1+ln(r
α
0+r
α
1 )q
β
1 ln q0)
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
=
rα0 q
β
0 (r
α
0+r
α
1 )q
β
1 ln
rα0 q
β
0
(rα0 +r
α
1 )q
β
1
ln
q1
q0
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
as rα0 q
β
0 (r
α
0 + r
α
1 )q
β
1 > 0, when the partial derivative equals zero, it is
ln
rα0 q
β
0
(rα0 + r
α
1 )q
β
1
ln
q1
q0
= 0
(
β ln
q0
q1
+ ln
rα0
rα0 + r
α
1
)
ln
q1
q0
= 0
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If q0 6= q1, hence , ln q1q0 6= 0:
β =
ln
rα
0
+rα
1
rα
0
ln q0
q1
Please note that r0 > r1 and this can be argued simply as r0 = p(0, 0) +
p(0, 1), r1 = p(1, 1). In order to let joint entropy gets as large as possible,
p(0, 0), p(0, 1), p(1, 1) should go towards uniform as much as possible, which
will definitely make r0 > r1.
Thus when β >
ln
q
β
0
+q
β
1
q
β
1
ln
r1
r0
, the above partial derivative is always < 0 while
when β <
ln
q
β
0
+q
β
1
q
β
1
ln
r1
r0
, the above partial derivative is always > 0.
Same as before, if q0 = q1, the problem can be simplified as single con-
straint problem which has been discussed in Chapter 5.
Then the only task left is to find suitable α and β to make the marginal
entropy satisfy H(X) = a and H(Y ) = b simultaneously. For X and Y only
taking two values each, the search is more or less direct as for each value of
entropies of X and Y , there are only two marginal distributions satisfying
them, hence, there are only four situations to consider in total which will be
discussed later in this chapter. However, once X and Y can take more values
each, the situation will become more and more complicated.
6.1.2 Three Variable Case of Simple Problem
In last section, there are only two high variables involved, in this section, we
show how more than two variables can also be derived using our analysis:
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In this section, we use X1, X2 and X3 to represent three high variables
such that X1 ≤ X2 ≤ X3 and all of them ∈ [0, 1], ri, qi, pi,j,k to represent
P (X1 = i), P (X2 = j), P (X1 = i,X2 = j,X3 = k) respectively, and with
constraints H(X1) = a and H(X2) = b (it can be entropies of any two of the
three). Please note that because X1 ≤ X2 ≤ X3, we only interested in pi,j,k
such that i ≤ j ≤ k.
The Lagrangian is:
Λ = −
∑
i,j,k
pi,j,k log pi,j,k − λ1(H(X1)− a)− λ2(H(X2)− b)− λ3(
∑
i,j,k
pi,j,k − 1)
(6.20)
which gives rise to the following family of partial derivative equations,
i ≤ j ≤ k, i, j, k ∈ [0, 1]:
∂Λ
∂p0,0,0
= −(log p0,0,0 + 1
ln 2
) +
λ1
ln 2
(ln r0 + 1) +
λ2
ln 2
(ln q0 + 1)− λ3 = 0
∂Λ
∂p0,0,1
= −(log p0,0,1 + 1
ln 2
) +
λ1
ln 2
(ln r0 + 1) +
λ2
ln 2
(ln q0 + 1)− λ3 = 0
∂Λ
∂p0,1,1
= −(log p0,1,1 + 1
ln 2
) +
λ1
ln 2
(ln r0 + 1) +
λ2
ln 2
(ln q1 + 1)− λ3 = 0
∂Λ
∂p1,1,1
= −(log p1,1,1 + 1
ln 2
) +
λ1
ln 2
(ln r1 + 1) +
λ2
ln 2
(ln q1 + 1)− λ3 = 0
Then we can derive:
p0,0,0 = p0,0,1 (6.21)
log
p0,1,1
p0,0,1
= λ2(log
q1
q0
) (6.22)
log
p1,1,1
p0,1,1
= λ1(log
r1
r0
) (6.23)
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Let α = λ1 and β = λ2:
p0,0,0 = p0,0,1 (6.24)
p0,1,1 =
(
q1
q0
)β
p0,0,1 (6.25)
p1,1,1 =
(
r1
r0
)β
p0,1,1 (6.26)
Thus:
p0,0,0 = p0,0,1 =
rα0 q
β
0
Z(α, β)
(6.27)
p0,1,1 =
rα0 q
β
1
Z(α, β)
(6.28)
p1,1,1 =
rα1 q
β
1
Z(α, β)
(6.29)
(6.30)
where Z(α) = 2rα0 q
β
0 + r
α
0 q
β
1 + r
α
1 q
β
1 .
Therefore, it also ends up searching for a suitable α and β, the same as
the two high variable case with two constraints.
The same derivation can be applied to the situation where X1 ≤ X2 ≤
X3; X1, X2, X3 ∈ [1, . . . , n].
The derivation of more high variables with two marginal entropy con-
straints is more or less the same as above, hence the result is also similar.
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6.2 General Case of Simple Problem
As in the case of single constraint problem, the further generalization is
to generalize the linear constraints between program variables X and Y as
0 < X ≤ aY +b (a, b ∈ R). Again, our abstract domain in integer polyhedra.
And for simplicity, we still assume that X, Y ∈ [1, . . . , n].
The same as above, let pi,j = P (X = i, Y = j), ri = P (X = i) and
qj = P (Y = j). Since 0 < X ≤ aY + b, we may only concern pi,j such that
i ≤ aj + b ∧ i, j ∈ N .
Suppose H(X) = H(~r) = a and H(Y ) = H(~q) = b, what is the maximum
possible value for H(X, Y ) = H(~p)?
Define the Lagrangian Λ as
Λ(~p) =
n∑
i,j aj+b≥i
−pi,j log pi,j−λ1(H(X)−a)−λ2(H(Y )− b)−λ3(
n∑
i,j
pi,j−1)
(6.31)
Partial derivative of each pi,j gives rise to the following equations, i ≤ aj +
b, i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}:
∂Λ
∂pi,j
= −(log pi,j+ 1
ln 2
)+λ1(log ri+
1
ln 2
)+λ2(log qj+
1
ln 2
)−λ3 = 0 (6.32)
More or less the same reasoning as before gives us the following proportion
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equations:
log
pi,j
pi,j′
= λ2
(
log
qj
q′j
)
(6.33)
log
pi,j
pi′,j
= λ1
(
log
ri
r′i
)
(6.34)
Then,
pi,j
pi,j′
=
qβj
q′βj
(6.35)
pi,j
pi′,j
=
rαi
r′αi
(6.36)
Suppose pi,j =
rαi q
β
j
Z(α,β)
where Z(α, β) =
∑n
i,j q
α
i r
β
j , it clearly satisfies the
requirements of Equations 6.35; then we only need to show that there exists
λ1, λ2, λ3 such that the partial derivative of pi,j holds. Substitute into
Equation 6.32:
∂Λ
∂pi,j
= −( r
α
i q
β
j
Z(α, β)
+ ln 2) + λ1(ri + ln 2) + λ2(qj + ln 2)− λ3 = 0
−(α log ri + β log qj − logZ(α, β) + 1
ln 2
) + λ1(log ri +
1
ln 2
) + λ2(log qj +
1
ln 2
)− λ3 = 0
(λ1 − α) log ri + (λ2 − β) log qj + logZ(α, β) + λ1 + λ2 − 1
ln 2
− λ3 = 0
Thus,
α = λ1
β = λ2
λ3 = logZ(α, β) +
α+β−1
ln 2
.
Therefore, pi,j =
rαi q
β
j
Z(α,β)
is the correct form for joint probability distribu-
tion.
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6.2.1 Properties of H(X) and H(Y ) in General Case
Similarly, in this sub-section, we prove the concaveness of H(X) and H(Y )
using the same reasoning as the last section.
Proof for H(X)
Proof.
H(X) = −∑ni=1 rαi Pnaj+b≥i qβjZ(α,β) log rαi Pnaj+b≥i qβjZ(α,β)
= −∑ni=1 rαi Pnaj+b≥i qβjZ(α,β) (log rαi ∑naj+b≥i qβj − logZ(α, β))
= logZ(α, β)−∑ni=1 rαi Pnaj+b≥i qβjZ(α,β) (log rαi ∑naj+b≥i qβj )
= logZ(α, β)−∑ni=1 rαi Pnaj+b≥i qβjZ(α,β) (α log ri + log(∑naj+b≥i qβj ))
= logZ(α, β)−∑ni=1 αrαi Pnaj+b≥i qβjZ(α,β) log ri −∑ni=1 rαi Pnaj+b≥i qβjZ(α,β) log(∑naj+b≥i qβj )
partial derivative of α is:
∂H(Y )
∂α
= Z
′(α,β)α
Z(α,β) ln 2
−∑ni=1 (rαi +αrαi ln ri)Z(α,β)−αrαi Z′(α,β)α(Z(α,β))2 ln 2 ∑naj+b≥i qβj ln ri
−∑ni=1 rαi ln riZ(α,β)−rαi Z′(α,β)α(Z(α,β))2 ln 2 ∑naj+b≥i qβj ln∑naj+b≥i qβj
= −∑ni=1 αrαi ln riZ(α,β)−αrαi Z′(α,β)α(Z(α,β))2 ln 2 ∑naj+b≥i qβj ln ri
−∑ni=1 rαi ln riZ(α,β)−rαi Z′(α,β)α(Z(α,β))2 ln 2 ∑naj+b≥i qβj ln∑naj+b≥i qβj
= −∑ni=1 rαi ln riPnaj+b≥i qβj ln rαi(Z(α,β))2 ln 2 Z(α, β)−∑ni=1 rαi ln riPnaj+b≥i qβj lnPnaj+b≥i qβj(Z(α,β))2 ln 2 Z(α, β)
+
∑n
i=1
rαi
Pn
aj+b≥i q
β
j ln r
α
i
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
Z ′(α, β)α +
∑n
i=1
rαi
Pn
aj+b≥i q
β
j ln
Pn
aj+b≥i q
β
j
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
Z ′(α, β)α
= −∑ni=1 rαi Pnaj+b≥i qβj ln ri ln(rαi Pnaj+b≥i qβj )Pni=1 rαi Pnaj+b≥i qβj(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
+
∑n
i=1
rαi
Pn
aj+b≥i q
β
j ln(r
α
i
Pn
aj+b≥i q
β
j )
Pn
i=1 r
α
i (ln ri)
Pn
aj+b≥i q
β
j
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
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As rαi
∑n
aj+b≥i q
β
j = ri, thus the above equation can be simplified as:
= −∑ni=1 ri ln ri ln(rαi ∑naj+b≥i qβj )∑ni=1 ri(Z(α,β))2 ln 2 +∑ni=1 ri ln(rαi ∑naj+b≥i qβj )∑ni=1 ri ln ri(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
= −∑ni=1 ri ln ri(α ln ri+ln∑naj+b≥i qβj )∑ni=1 ri(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
+
∑n
i=1
ri(α ln ri+ln
∑n
aj+b≥i q
β
j )
∑n
i=1 ri ln ri
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
A careful calculation can get when the above equation is zero, the value of
α is:
α =
∑n−1
i6=j, aj+b≥i, i=1 rirj ln
rj
ri
ln
∑n
m=i q
β
m∑n
l=j q
β
l∑n−1
i6=j, aj+b≥i, i=1 rirj
(
ln
rj
ri
)2
Thus when α >
Pn−1
i6=j, aj+b≥i, i=1
rirj ln
rj
ri
ln
Pn
m=i q
β
m
Pn
l=j
q
β
lPn−1
i6=j, aj+b≥i, i=1
rirj
“
ln
rj
ri
”2 , the above partial derivative is
always < 0 while when α <
Pn−1
i6=j, aj+b≥i, i=1
rirj ln
rj
ri
ln
Pn
m=i q
β
m
Pn
l=j
q
β
lPn−1
i6=j, aj+b≥i, i=1
rirj
“
ln
rj
ri
”2 , the above partial
derivative is always > 0.
Proof for H(Y )
Proof.
H(Y ) = −∑ni=1 qβi Pj≤ai+b rαjZ(α,β) log qβi Pj≤ai+b rαjZ(α,β)
= −∑ni=1 qβi Pj≤ai+b rαjZ(α,β) (log qβi ∑nj≤ai+b rαj − logZ(α, β))
= logZ(α, β)−∑ni=1 qβi Pnj≤ai+b rαjZ(α,β) (log qβi ∑nj≤ai+b rαj )
= logZ(α, β)−∑ni=1 qβi Pnj≤ai+b rαjZ(α,β) (β log qi + log(∑nj≤ai+b rαj ))
= logZ(α, β)−∑ni=1 βqβi Pnj≤ai+b rαjZ(α,β) log qi −∑ni=1 qβi Pnj≤ai+b rαjZ(α,β) log(∑nj≤ai+b rαj )
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partial derivative of β is:
∂H(Y )
∂β
=
Z′(α,β)β
Z(α,β) ln 2
−∑ni=1 (qβi +βqβi ln qi)Z(α,β)−βqβi Z′(α,β)β(Z(α,β))2 ln 2 ∑nj≤ai+b rαj ln qi
−∑ni=1 qβi ln qiZ(α,β)−qβi Z′(α,β)β(Z(α,β))2 ln 2 ∑nj≤ai+b rαj ln∑nj≤ai+b rαj
= −∑ni=1 βqβi ln qiZ(α,β)−βqβi Z′(α,β)β(Z(α,β))2 ln 2 ∑nj≤ai+b rαj ln qi
−∑ni=1 qβi ln qiZ(α,β)−qβi Z′(α,β)β(Z(α,β))2 ln 2 ∑nj≤ai+b rαj ln∑nj≤ai+b rαj
= −∑ni=1 qβi ln qiPnj≤ai+b rαj ln qβi(Z(α,β))2 ln 2 Z(α, β)−∑ni=1 qβi ln qiPnj≤ai+b rαj lnPnj≤ai+b rαj(Z(α,β))2 ln 2 Z(α, β)
+
∑n
i=1
q
β
i
Pn
j≤ai+b r
α
j ln q
β
i
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
Z ′(α, β)β +
∑n
i=1
q
β
i
Pn
j≤ai+b r
α
j ln
Pn
j≤ai+b r
α
j
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
Z ′(α, β)β
= −∑ni=1 qβi Pnj≤ai+b rαj ln qi ln(qβi Pnj≤ai+b rαj )Pni=1 qβi Pnj≤ai+b rαj(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
+
∑n
i=1
q
β
i
Pn
j≤ai+b r
α
j ln(q
β
i
Pn
j≤ai+b r
α
j )
Pn
i=1 q
β
i (ln qi)
Pn
j≤ai+b r
α
j
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
As qβi
∑n
j≤ai+b r
α
j = qi, thus the above equation can be simplified as:
= −∑ni=1 qi ln qi ln(qβi Pnj≤ai+b rαj )Pni=1 qi(Z(α,β))2 ln 2 +∑ni=1 qi ln(qβi Pnj≤ai+b rαj )Pni=1 qi ln qi(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
= −∑ni=1 qi ln qi(β ln qi+lnPnj≤ai+b rαj )Pni=1 qi(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
+
∑n
i=1
qi(β ln qi+ln
Pn
j≤ai+b r
α
j )
Pn
i=1 qi ln qi
(Z(α,β))2 ln 2
A careful calculation can get, when the above equation is zero, the value of
β is:
β =
∑n−1
i6=j, j≤ai+b, i=1 qiqj ln
qj
qi
ln
∑i
m=1 r
α
m∑j
l=1 r
α
l∑n−1
i6=j, j≤ai+b, i=1 qiqj
(
ln
qj
qi
)2
Thus when β >
Pn−1
i6=j, j≤ai+b, i=1
qiqj ln
qj
qi
ln
Pi
m=1 r
α
m
Pj
l=1
rα
lPn−1
i6=j, j≤ai+b, i=1
qiqj
“
ln
qj
qi
”2 , the above partial deriva-
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tive is always < 0 while when β <
Pn−1
i6=j, j≤ai+b, i=1
qiqj ln
qj
qi
ln
Pi
m=1 r
α
m
Pj
l=1
rα
lPn−1
i6=j, j≤ai+b, i=1
qiqj
“
ln
qj
qi
”2 , the above
partial derivative is always > 0.
6.2.2 Three Variable Case of Simple Problem
In this section, we extend the discussion above to three variable case.
We still use X1, X2 and X3 to represent three high variables such that
c′X1 + d
′ ≤ X2 ≤ cX3 + d and all of them ∈ [1, n], ri, qi, pi,j,k to represent
P (X1 = i), P (X2 = j), P (X1 = i,X2 = j,X3 = k) respectively, and with
constraints H(X1) = a and H(X2) = b (it can be entropies of any two of the
three). Please note that because c′X1+d ≤ X2 ≤ cX3+d, we only interested
in pi,j,k such that c
′i+ d′ ≤ j ≤ ck + d.
The Lagrangian is:
Λ = −
∑
i,j,k
pi,j,k log pi,j,k − λ1(H(X1)− a)− λ2(H(X2)− b)− λ3(
∑
i,j,k
pi,j,k − 1)
(6.37)
which gives rise to the following family of partial derivative equations,
c′i+ d′ ≤ j ≤ ck + d, i, j, k ∈ [0, 1]:
∂Λ
∂pi,j,k
= −(log pi,j,k + 1
ln 2
) +
λ1
ln 2
(ln ri + 1) +
λ2
ln 2
(ln qj + 1)− λ3 = 0
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Then we can derive:
pi,j,k = pi,j,k′ k 6= k′ (6.38)
log
pi,j,k
pi,j′,k
= λ2(log
qj
q′j
) (6.39)
log
pi,j,k
pi′,j,k
= λ1(log
ri
r′i
) (6.40)
Let α = λ1 and β = λ2:
pi,j,k = pi,j,k′ k 6= k′ (6.41)
pi,j′,k =
(
q′j
qj
)β
pi,j,k (6.42)
pi′,j,k =
(
r′i
ri
)β
pi,j,k (6.43)
Thus:
pi,j,k = pi,j,k′ =
rαi q
β
j
Z(α, β)
(6.44)
where Z(α) =
∑
i,j,k pi,j,k.
Therefore, it also ends up searching for a suitable α and β, the same as
the two high variable case with two constraints.
The derivation of more high variables with two marginal entropy con-
straints is more or less the same as above, hence the result is also similar.
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6.3 Generalization of Simple Problem
The further generalization is to generalize the linear constraints between
program variables X and Y to an arbitrary system of 0 < a′iY + b
′
i < X ≤
aiY + bi, (ai, a
′
i, bi, b
′
i ∈ R). And X, Y ∈ [1, . . . , n].
The whole derivation procedure is exactly the same as the last section
which is omitted for the sake of space. The only thing which changes is that
in stead of considering pi,j such that i ≤ aj + b, now we consider pi,j such
that a′ij + b
′
i < i ≤ aij + bi.
Please note that if i ≤ aj + b1 and i ≤ aj + b2 where b1 ≤ b2, then
the constraint i ≤ aj + b2 will not be considered, similarly for other cases.
The work of [6] can be used to derive a most precise integer polyhedra from
the system of constraints. Therefore, in our analysis, we always assume
that we work on the smallest integer polyhedra derived from the system of
constraints.
The result pi,j =
rαi q
β
j
Z(α,β)
still holds, where Z(α, β) =
∑n
i,j q
α
i r
β
j .
6.4 Case Study
In this section, the case of X and Y taking two values each is explored, some
interesting properties have been discovered. We choose this as a demonstra-
tion also because it is not too difficult to verify.
Recall the entropy of binary variable (Figure 6.1), we can see that for
each value of entropy, there are only two corresponding possible probability
distributions. Thus there are at most four joint probabilities from which to
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choose the one with maximum joint entropy.
Figure 6.1: Concaveness of Entropy Function
The following Table 6.1 shows the values of α and β for the maximum
joint entropy given different values of marginal entropy constraints.
Column H(X) is the value of the marginal constraint of X, we start from
0.4690 and increase it to its maximum 1, other values can be chosen freely
as well.
Similarly, Column H(Y ) is the value of the marginal constraint of Y ,
we start from 0.4690 and increase it to its maximum 1, other values can be
chosen freely as well. Together withH(X), they work as a pair of constraints.
Column α and column β are the corresponding values for α and β that
gives us the maximum joint entropy under two marginal constraints, where
− means such α or β don’t exist.
As we can see from Table 6.1, there are cases when there are no suitable
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H(X) H(Y ) α β Hmax(X,Y ) H(X) +H(Y ) P (X, Y )
0.4690 0.4690 0 -0.9464 0.9219 0.9380 (0.1,0.8,0.1)
0.4690 0.7219 0.8856 0.9037 1.1568 1.1909 (0.2,0.7,0.1)
0.4690 0.8813 0.8155 0.8181 1.2955 1.3503 (0.3,0.6,0.1)
0.4690 0.9710 0.7325 0.5503 1.3610 1.4400 (0.4,0.5,0.1)
0.4690 1 - - 1.3610 1.4690 (0.5,0.4,0.1)
0.7219 0.4690 0.9037 0.8856 1.1568 1.1909 (0.1,0.7,0.2)
0.7219 0.7219 0.7925 0.7925 1.3710 1.4438 (0.2,0.6,0.2)
0.7219 0.8813 0.6610 0.6029 1.4855 1.6032 (0.3,0.5,0.2)
0.7219 0.9710 0.5 0 1.5219 1.6929 (0.4,0.4,0.2)
0.7219 1 - - 1.4855 1.7219 (0.5,0.3,0.2)
0.8813 0.4690 0.8181 0.8155 1.2955 1.3503 (0.1,0.6,0.3)
0.8813 0.7219 0.6029 0.6610 1.4855 1.6032 (0.2,0.5,0.3)
0.8813 0.8813 0.3395 0.3395 1.5710 1.7626 (0.3,0.4,0.3)
0.8813 0.9710 0 -0.7095 1.5710 1.8523 (0.4,0.3,0.3)
0.8813 1 - - 1.4855 1.8813 (0.5,0.2,0.3)
0.9710 0.4690 0.5503 0.7325 1.3610 1.4400 (0.1,0.5,0.4)
0.9710 0.7219 0 0.5 1.5219 1.6929 (0.2,0.4,0.4)
0.9710 0.8813 -0.7095 0 1.5710 1.8523 (0.3,0.3,0.4)
0.9710 0.9710 -1.7095 -1.7095 1.5219 1.9420 (0.4,0.2,0.4)
0.9710 1 - - 1.3610 1.9710 (0.5,0.4,0.1)
1 0.4690 - - 1.3610 1.4690 (0.1,0.4,0.5)
1 0.7219 - - 1.4855 1.7219 (0.2,0.3,0.5)
1 0.8813 - - 1.4855 1.8823 (0.3,0.2,0.5)
1 0.9710 - - 1.3610 1.9710 (0.4,0.1,0.5)
1 1 - - 1 2 (0.5,0,0.5)
Table 6.1: Values of α and β for Maximum Joint Entropy
161
α or β, this situation usually happens when one of the marginal entropy
hits its maximum, which means that in the case where X and Y are binary,
there is only one joint probability distribution that satisfies both marginal
entropies, hence there is only one joint entropy which is also the maximum
joint entropy.
Proposition 6.4.1. Let X and Y be binary variables such that X ≤ Y , let
H(X) = a and H(Y ) = b, suppose α and β corresponding to the maximum
joint entropy H(X, Y ) exist, then given two other binary variables X ′ and Y ′,
if H(X ′) = b and H(Y ′) = a, α′ and β′ for maximum joint entropy H(X ′, Y ′)
also exist, then α′ = β and β′ = α.
Proof. Because X and Y are binary variables, given their marginal entropies,
there are at most four possible joint entropies, let’s denote the corresponding
probabilities as P (X = 0) = x, P (X = 1) = 1 − x, P (Y = 0) = y, P (Y =
1) = 1− y, thus the following holds:
P (X = 0, Y = 0) = y =
xα ∗ yβ
Z(α, β)
P (X = 0, Y = 1) = x− y = x
α ∗ (1− y)β
Z(α, β)
P (X = 1, Y = 1) = 1− x = (1− x)
α ∗ (1− y)β
Z(α, β)
where Z(α, β) =
∑
i,j P (X = i)
α ∗ P (Y = j)β
Now since the values of two marginal entropies are the same if we don’t
consider which one takes which value, if the above joint distribution is the
one with maximum joint entropy for X and Y , it also should be the joint
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distribution with maximum joint entropy for X ′ and Y ′. In order to get the
same joint distribution (don’t consider which number takes which probabil-
ity), we can construct the probabilities as P (X ′ = 0) = 1−y, P (X ′ = 1) = y,
P (Y ′ = 0) = 1− x and P (Y ′ = 1) = 1− y, thus the following holds:
1− x = (1− y)
α′ ∗ (1− x)β′
Z(α′, β′)
x− y = (1− y)
α′ ∗ xβ′
Z(α′, β′)
y =
yα
′ ∗ xβ′
Z(α′, β′)
where Z(α, β) =
∑
i,j P (X
′ = i)α
′ ∗ P (Y ′ = j)β′ .
Comparing with the joint distribution for X and Y , it is not difficult to
see that α′ = β and β′ = α.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
This chapter summarizes the contributions of this thesis and outlines some
directions for possible future work.
7.1 Summary
Focused on the problem of quantifying maximum information leakage in pro-
grams, this thesis connects information security with Shannon’s information
theory and mathematical techniques such as Lagrange multiplier.
Noticing the intrinsic issues (i.e. double counting problem) that exist
against current framework of quantitative information flow analysis (CHM’s),
this thesis looks to improve the accuracy of maximum information leakage.
More precisely, we concern quantifying maximum information leakage under
certain constraints, maximum entropy of individual high program variable,
which is non-linear.
The improvement of accuracy is achieved by using joint entropy as the
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quantity of maximum information leakage instead of the sum of entropies of
high program variables; then the Lagrange multiplier method is applied to
obtain the maximum information leakage under constraints. For the single
marginal entropy constraint problem, the partition version of joint entropy is
applied (Section 5.3) to further simplify the derivation. We have shown that
for the single marginal constraint problem, the maximum joint entropy prob-
lem can be brought down to search for a parameter α which when applied
to the structure of probability distribution derived from our analysis, guar-
antees the maximum information leakage. For the two marginal constraints
problem, it turns out that a search for a pair of parameters α and β gives us
the result.
As a matter of fact, our analysis is general enough to be applied to ar-
bitrary number of high program variables with an arbitrary system of linear
constraints under arbitrary number of marginal entropy constraints. How-
ever, please note that in order to get the maximum information leakage as
precise as possible, the system of linear constraints is required to be as small
as possible, in other words, for example if there are both X ≤ cY + d and
X ≤ cY + d′ in the set, where d ≤ d′ then X ≤ cY + d′ is discarded. There-
fore in our work, we always assume that the linear constraint set is the most
precise, and hence the integer polyhedron derived from it that we work on is
also the smallest.
7.1.1 Most General Case
Therefore, the most general case would be:
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Suppose we have n variables X1, . . . , Xn ∈ N , and a system of linear
constraints S (Xi ≤ a1X1 + . . . + anXn + bi, ai, bi ∈ R) between these
variables, together with m marginal entropy constraints, let’s denote the
variables which have marginal entropy constraints as Xl1 , . . . , Xlm and of
course m ≤ n. pi1,...,in denotes the joint probability of P (X1 = x1, . . . , Xn =
xn), and plito represent the probability of Xli = xli .
By following the exact derivation process, it is not too difficult to obtain
the general form of probability distribution which gives the maximum joint
entropy:
pi1, ..., l1,..., lm, ...,in = pi′1, ..., l1,..., lm, ...,i′n =
pα1l1 · · · pαmlm
Z(α1, . . . , αm)
Where Z(α1, . . . , αm) =
∑
i1,...,in
pi1,...,in .
7.1.2 Limitation
Although theoretically our analysis is very general, and an analytical formula
is provided to construct the probability distribution which gives the maxi-
mum joint entropy. However, only the single constraint problem is feasible,
a search for a single parameter α which a binary search does the job.
For more than one marginal entropy constraint, tuple of parameters
needed to obtain the probability distributions, and we haven’t found an
efficient method to search for such tuple of parameters yet, and it is also
possible that some parameters don’t exist, nevertheless the probability dis-
tribution can still be obtained without these parameters sometimes as shown
in Chapter 6.
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7.2 Future Work
The future work from ours may include the following:
7.2.1 Scalability
Tables 5.1 to 5.6 show that when the number n of values that X and Y can
take increases in the single constraint problem, the ratio of our result and
CHM’s result keeps increasing as well.
This is mainly due to the fact that when n → ∞, and suppose that we
do the partition according to Y (or X), no matter what linear constraint
that may exist between X and Y , the size of largest part in the partition
goes towards ∞ as well. By adopting our analysis, the marginal probability
distribution qi of Y which purely depends on the sizes of the parts will lean
towards 0, 0, . . . , 1. Then our analysis whose result is Hmax(X, Y ) = H(Y )+∑
i qi log i, will becomeH(Y )+log∞ which is∞. And CHM’s analysis which
is H(Y ) + log n, also has the same result of ∞. Therefore in this extreme
case, our result doesn’t have any advantage over CHM’s.
Hence it seems that our analysis only has a significant superiority when
n is small. When n increase, the maximum joint entropy also increases, thus
a completely new way to deal with large n with the aim to make the result
more precise than that of our current analysis is needed.
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7.2.2 Effective Search Method for More Constraints
Problem and Complexity
Our analysis is theoretically quite general in terms of the system of linear
constraints and marginal entropy constraints. And it all has the nice property
such that in the end only tuple of parameters are needed to construct the
probability distribution which gives the maximum joint entropy. Therefore,
it is worth investigating how to effectively search for such tuple of suitable
parameters.
For the two marginal entropy constraints problem, as we cannot derive the
structure of either marginal probability of X or Y at the moment, this makes
the search of suitable α and β extremely difficult. One possible area for future
investigation is to transform the question into a single constraint problem,
and search for α and β alternatively. In more detail, two random marginal
probability distributions (except uniform distribution) can be chosen, one
for X the other for Y . First we fix β to 1, and substitute these two original
distributions into the formula:
pi, j =
rαi q
β
j
Z(α, β)
then do a binary search, as in the single constraint problem, to look for a
marginal distribution for X such that it satisfies the marginal entropy H(X)
constraint. Then this new marginal probability P (X) is substituted into ri,
and α is fixed to 1, together with the original marginal probability distri-
bution P (Y ), a new binary search for β which to make the new probability
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distribution satisfy the marginal entropy constraint H(Y ) is conducted the
same way as that for H(X) constraint, then the new marginal probability
distribution of P (Y ) is substituted into qj.
This whole process is, thereafter, iterated, until α and β converges, in
other words, the two marginal probability distributions calculated from joint
probability distribution converge. However, investigation into the conver-
gence issue of this proposed thought algorithm will be needed first which
itself can be a very difficult problem.
The investigation of more constraint problem can be more difficult and
complicated.
The complexity of search algorithm can grow exponentially with the num-
ber of marginal entropy constraints, methods to reduce the complexity is also
worth working on.
7.2.3 Implementation
The ultimate goal would be to implement our analysis into a practical analysis
tool, which automatically bounds the maximum information leakage that
certain programs or systems may have.
The automation for the single constraint problem can be straightforward,
breaks the problem into automation for three parts: linear constraints (in-
teger polyhedron) obtained by abstract interpretation, a partition based on
the integer polyhedron, and a search for α. The automation of first part is
already been implemented in [22]; while the automation of the second part
can be turned into solve a system of linear inequalities for which automatic
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algorithms exist; while for the third part a binary search algorithm satisfies
our needs.
However, for the problems with more marginal constraints, the automa-
tion has to search for tuple of parameters simultaneously, hence it is very
likely that some new algorithm would be needed to solve the problem.
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